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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the former de jure segregated states, there still exist public
colleges and universities easily identifiable by race as being predominantly
white or predominantly black institutions.2 In almost all cases, the current
racial identifiability reflects the historical creation and existence of higher
education institutions as being for "black students" or for "white students." This
dual system of higher education continues to exist despite the desegregation
decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court beginning in Brown v.
Board of Education.3
The question of what standard to apply in determining the state's duty to
dismantle its dual system of higher education was finally resolved by the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Fordice.4 In that case, the Court
determined that the State of Mississippi had failed to meet its affirmative
obligation to dismantle the prior dejure segregated system by adopting race
1 B.A., Amherst College, 1990;J.D., Harvard Law School, 1994; member of the Illinois
Bar. Mr. Patterson is currently a law clerk for the Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. I want to thank my parents,
Randy Kennedy, Jay Heubert and especially RMJ.
2 The terms historically white universities [hereinafter HWU] and historically black
universities [hereinafter HBUI shall be used to refer to these institutions.
3347 U.S. 483 (1954) [Brown f], supplemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [Brown II]; see also
Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 83 So.2d 20 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 413
(1956) (in denying cert., the Court, in a per curiam opinion, applied the principles of Brown
I to higher education and rejected the "all deliberate speed" remedy of Brown II as
inapplicable to desegregation in higher education); Green v. County School Board of
New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (desegregation means no black schools or white
schools but rather "just schools").
4112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992). This case was originally titled Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp.
1523 (N.D. Miss.1987). TheSupreme Court caption reflects the intervention of theUnited
States and the election of Governor Kirk Fordice.
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neutral policies that govern its university system.
5 The courts below, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi, applied their interpretation of the standard established
in Brown I and II and concluded that the State had fulfilled its duty to
disestablish a segregated school system by adopting race-neutral policies in
good faith.6
The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision and remanded the
case to the court of appeals and the district court with instructions to apply a
new appropriate standard. This standard queries whether the "[s]tate
perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its prior system that continue to
have segregative effects."7 The decision is a landmark one because it affects
policymaking in all of the former de jure states. 8 Yet, the Fordice decision did
nothing more than tell the States what standard to apply. The decision did not
explain how the States should address the continuing vestiges of separate and
unequal public higher education.
This question of how to address the continuing vestiges of segregation in
public higher education is really a microcosm of the same issue in the context
of American society. It is a question that America has been grappling with since
the decision in Brown I sounded the death knell of the separate but equal
doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson.
9 The solutions proposed for
desegregating the university system of Mississippi mirror those proposed for
the desegregation of American society. These proposals range from
maintaining the status quo to closing the black institutions to keeping the black
institutions exclusively black to simply reaffirming the integrative ideal
articulated in Brown I.
More specifically, in the white community, some commentators propose the
maintenance of the status quo. The argument is that the State no longer
segregates by law and once the legal barriers are removed, the State has met its
duty to desegregate.) 0 Other commentators propose a solution whereby the
SId. at 2732.
6 Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990), afj'g, 674 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Miss.
1987).
7Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2727, 2730.
8 See, e.g., Sarah C. Campbell, Ayers Trial Comes to End with Ruling Months Away, THE
COMMERCIAL APPEAL, July 15, 1994, at 1A; Stuart McKeel, Court Ruling Could Hurt
Desegregation, NEWS & RECORD, Nov. 2,1994, at B1 (discussing the struggle of the North
Carolina University system to desegregate itself.); Janet Elliot, Deans Eye Texas Case;
Law-School Challenge: Bakke of the Legal World?, LEGAL TIMES, May 23, 1994, at 4; Shirely
Downing, Tennessee College Bias Suit Mirrors Mississippi 26-year old Case Coming to the
Fore, THE COMMERICAL APPEAL, May 15,1994, at 1A; Eric Harrison, Desegregation 
Called
Peril to Black Colleges, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1994, at 1.
9163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10 See, e.g., Mary Ann Connell, The Road to United States v. Fordice: What is the Duty of
Public Colleges and Universities in Former De Jure States To Desegregate? 62 MiSS. L.J. 285
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HBUs are closed or merged into the HWUs (with the HWUs as the surviving
institution) as the most appropriate and expedient way to comply with the
mandates of Fordice and Brown.11 The argument is that under Brown, separate
is inherently unequal, thus the continued existence of the HBUs violates Brown.
Moreover, given the clear superiority of the HWUs and the proximity of the
HBUs to the HWUs, financially and educationally it makes sense to close the
inferior schools or merge them into the superior schools in order to comply
with Fordice. In short, no more HBUs and no more HWUs, instead "just schools."
I strongly disagree with these commentators because they ignore two critical
issues. First, they ignore past discrimination. Second, they ignore the issue of
increasing the educational opportunities of black students. Past discrimination
in education, particularly at the grade school level, makes college unattainable
for many black children because they do not meet the qualifications for
admission.12 Moreover, for those who do meet the admissions requirements
there is the consideration of cost. As school budgets decrease, there is a
corresponding decrease in available scholarship money and minority
scholarships have come under attack as well. 13 HBUs address past
discrimination by retaining low admissions standards, offering remedial
courses, and are affordable. Thus, to argue for the elimination of the HBUs
through either mergers or closures is to effectively eliminate the sole means of
access to higher education for many black children and thereby decrease rather
than increase educational opportunities for black students.
In the black community, there is a deep ambivalence about desegregation. 14
This ambivalence is captured best by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
(1993) (arguing that once the state discontinues legally enforced segregation, any further
segregation must be by "unfettered choice").
11 See, e.g., Robert N. Davis, The Quest for Equal Education in Mississippi: The
Implications of United States v. Fordice, 62 MIss. L.J. 405 (1993) (presenting fourteen
recommendations for compliance with Fordice which include the closure and merger of
HBUs with HWUs because the HBUs are inferior); Kenyon D. Bunch and Grant B.
Mindle, Testing the Limits of Precedent: The Application of Green to the Desegregation of
Higher Education, 2 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 541 (1992) (arguing that "if courts were
serious about desegregating HBUs . . .there would have been more mergers of
geographically proximate institutions").
12 See, e.g., JEAN PREER, LAWYERS V. EDUCATORS (1982); KENNETH S. TOLLET, BLACK
COLLEGES AS INSTRUMENTS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1982); Gil Kujovich, Equal
Opportunity in Higher Education and the Black Public College: The Era of Separate But Equal,
72 MINN. L. REV. 29 (1987).
13 See, e.g., American Council on Education, Access by Minorities to Higher Education
in Peril, CHRON. OFHIGHER EDUC., Jan. 20,1993, at 5; Budget Cuts Seen Imperiling Minority
Enrollment Gains, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 20,1993, at 10; see also Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d
147 (4th Cir. 1994) (striking down race-based scholarship).
14 See, e.g., Drew S. Days, Im, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 53 (1992).
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Fund, Inc. (LDF)'s desegregation litigation.15 Over time, this litigation
campaign has evoked a variety of responses in the black community. On the
one hand, there are those commentators who suggest that the HBUs should
stay exclusively black in terms of students, faculty and staff. They assert that
the HBUs serve the vital function of educating black students and the
desegregation of these schools would seriously undermine the ability of the
HBUs to continue to serve this vital function.16 On the other hand, there are
those who firmly believe in the integration ideal. They contend that separate
is inherently unequal and as such exclusive black institutions are a step
backwards. 17 Finally, some commentators take the middle road by advocating
the continued existence of the HBUs, but also advocating financial
enhancement of those institutions. 18
I disagree with the black commentators as well. Those who advocate
voluntary separation must realize that, at least politically, no white politician
can justify large expenditures on institutions where a large segment of his or
her constituency is excluded. If the state does not spend the funds to enhance
the HBUs, then separation leaves black students stuck in clearly inferior
institutions. Separation, then, does not improve educational opportunity for
black students and therefore solves nothing. Those who advocate closure of the
HBUs in the name of integration and Brown I ignore the fact that history has
demonstrated the remarkable job that HBUs both public and private have done
in educating black students. They ignore these accomplishments and place the
burden of integration on the very black institutions that have continued to
perform well even in these days of "integration." Finally, those that propose
mere enhancement of the HBUs fail to realize that enhancement alone will not
produce integration because it does not change student choices. White students
will continue to attend well-funded HWUs and now, black students can attend
well-funded HBUs.
As a result of the problems encountered by these various proposals, I
propose a plan of my own that preserves HBUs to the extent that they are
desegregated along with the white institutions rather than just eliminated. In
this way, the burdens of integration are shared in both communities by both
sets of institutions. More specifically, with respect to higher education in
Mississippi,19 I propose the following solution to address the current situation:
15 See, e.g., Kujovich, supra note 12.
16 See, e.g., TOLLET, supra note 12; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Waiting on the Promise of Brown,
39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 346 (1975); W.E.B. DuBois, Separation and Self-Respect, THE
CRISIS, March 1934, at 85.
17 See, e.g., Richard Cummings, All-Male Black Schools: Equal Protection, The New
Separatism and Brown v. Board of Education, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725 (1993); NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. desegregation litigation strategy, infra note 250.
18 See, e.g., infra notes 221, 281-84, and 290.
191 focus on Mississippi for several reasons. First, the Fordice case arose in that state.
Second, as part of its decision in the case, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the
district court in Mississippi where the retrial was concluded on November 3, 1994.
[Vol. 42:377
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first, Mississippi should close or merge some of the HWUs but not the HBUs
for the reasons previously articulated and then adopt a two tier system of
classification. Second, course offerings and admission standards will be tied to
the classification. Finally, the HBUs and HWUs should adopt affirmative action
programs for the minority (i.e., for blacks at HWUs and for whites at HBUs)
students, faculty, and administrators. My proposal has as its goal to encourage
integration while recognizing the important function served by the HBUs.
This paper is divided into four parts. In the first part, I explain what the
Supreme Court held in United States v. Fordice.20 In the second part, I present
and critique the proposals generated in the white community. In the third part,
I present and critique LDF's desegregation litigation strategy and the proposals
generated therefrom. Finally, in the fourth part, I respond to these various
commentators with my own proposal.
II. PART I: UNITED STATES V. FORDICE
The procedural history of the Fordice case demonstrates the difficulties
engendered by the issue of desegregation in higher education. In brief, the
district court21 dismissed the plaintiffs' claim, the Fifth Circuit panel reversed
the district court,22 the en banc court vacated the panel decision and affirmed
the district court23 and finally, the Supreme Court rendered a decision.24
This lawsuit began in 1975 when a group of black plaintiffs sued the
Governor of Mississippi, the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher
Learning, and other state education officials, alleging that the defendants were
maintaining and perpetuatinga racially dual system of public higher education
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.25
Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that since the time of Brown, the defendants
had perpetuated a dual system of higher education in which there were
separate institutions for blacks and whites, and in which the black institutions
Finally, during the course of the retrial, Benjamin Chavis, then Executive Director of the
NAACP stated that "we aregoing to lift Mississippi up as an example." Associated Press,
NAACP Head Warns of Boycott ifAyers Case isn't Resolved, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, May
25, 1994, at lB. He said the Ayers v. Fordice case will have more implications for
Americans than Brown v. Board of Education. Id. Given the impact that any decision in
the case is likely to have, it is apropos to focus on Mississippi.
20112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
2 lAyers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Miss. 1987) lAyers I].
22 Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.) [Ayers II], reh'g granted, 898 F.2d 1014 (5th
Cir. 1990)(en banc).
23Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) [Ayers III], remanded and
vacated sub nom. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
24United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
25Ayers III, 914 F.2d at 678.
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were "markedly inferior" to the white institutions. 26 The complaint alleged that
the HBUs remained separate and inferior to the HWUs due to the defendants
discriminatory practices on student admissions, employment of faculty and
staff, mission designations and funding, and operation of HWUs in close
proximity to HBUs. 27 Plaintiffs further asserted that defendants had failed in
their affirmative duty to eliminate vestiges of segregation and remained,
therefore, under a continuing "legal obligation to eliminate the vestiges of racial
dualism 'root and branch'."2 8
Defendants answered the allegations of plaintiffs by contending that a
good-faith, nondiscriminatory admission and operation policy with respect to
students, faculty and staff had been implemented and that with such a policy
designed to insure equality of opportunity, the mere continued existence of
institutions with predominantly black and predominantly white student
bodies did not represent a denial of equal protection.29 Defendants further
maintained that any racial identifiability was the result of the unfettered
freedom of choice of students themselves as they considered varying
educational objectives and advantages of the respective institutions.30
In 1987, following twelve years of pretrial preparation, the district court
conducted a five week trial.3 1 The record consisted of testimony from 71
witnesses and 56,700 pages of exhibits. 32 The district court ruled in favor of the
defendants on the issue of liability and dismissed plaintiff's case.3 3 In arriving
at its decision, the district court noted that from the time of Brown and until
1962 when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the University of
Mississippi to admit James Meredith as a student, the Board of Trustees had
continued to operate a racially dual system of higher education which was
"both separate and unequal."34 According to Judge Neal Biggers, however, "the
fundamental issue before the court at this time is whether the defendants are
currently committing violations of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, Title VI and 42 U.S.C. 1981."35
Judge Biggers found that since 1962 defendants had in good faith adopted
racially neutral admission policies at all public colleges and universities, had
utilized affirmative efforts to recruit and retain other-race students, and had
2 6Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1525.
271d.
281d.
291d.
301d.
3 lAyers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1526.
321d.
331d. at 1564.
341d. at 1528.
351d. at 1551.
[Vol. 42:377
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satisfied "their affirmative duty to dismantle the former segregated system
insofar as the duty pertains to student enrollment."36 "Although the various
institutions continue to be identifiable by the racial makeup of the student
populations, this is not a substantial result of current admission practices and
procedures but is instead the result of a free and unfettered choice on the part
of individual students."37
The district court further found that defendants had adopted racially neutral
hiring policies with respect to faculty and staff at each university and had
expended substantial affirmative efforts each year attempting to attract and
employ other-race faculty. The court noted that since 1974, the percentage of
blacks hired in faculty and staff positions exceeded the black representation in
the qualified labor pool and held that defendants had "satisfied their
affirmative duty to dismantle the former segregated system as it pertains to
faculty and staff employment."3 8
Moreover, the court found the mission designations of the respective
institutions to be educationally sound, based on nondiscriminatory purposes,
and justified by a need to conserve scarce educational resources.39 In summary,
the court dismissed the case because it found that the defendants were fulfilling
"their affirmative duty to disestablish the former de jure segregated system of
higher education"40 and that there was no proof in the record "of current
violation of the Constitution or Statutes of the United States by the
Defendants."41
In making these factual findings, Judge Biggers rejected the remedial
standard articulated in Green v. County School Board42 and instead, applied the
3 6Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1558.
3 71d.
381d. at 1563.
391d. at 1564.
401d. at 1561.
4 lAyers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1561.
42391 U.S. 430 (1968). Green involved the grade school system of New Kent County,
Virginia, which contained two schools. Id. at 434. New Kent School a combined
elementary/secondary school on th eastern side of the county, was predominantly
white; Watkins School, a combined elementary/ secondary school on the western side
of the county, was totally black. Id. There was no residential segregation in the county,
and there were no attendance zones. Id. Each school served the entire county and buses
traveled overlapping routes to transport pupils to and from the two schools. Id.
The county's school board continued to maintain totally segregated schools for
eleven years after Brown I and modified this practice only after Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 mandated the cutting off of federal funds to school districts which continued
to operate racially segregated schools. Green, 391 U.S. at 434. The school board then
adopted a freedom-of-choice plan, which allowed students to choose annually which
school to attend. Id. During the plan's three years of operation, no white student had
chosen to attend the all-black Watkins school, and only 15% of the black students were
1993-941
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remedial standard set forth in Bazemore v. Friday43 and Alabama State
Teachers Association v. Alabama Public School and College Authority (hereinafter
enrolled in New Kent School, the formerly all-white school. Id. In essence, the
freedom-of-choice plan had not worked to dismantle the previously segregated school
system. Id. at 440.
Justice Brennan's opinion for a unanimous Court emphasized the ultimate goal of
"disestablishing" or "dismantling" dual school systems and achieving a "unitary,
nonracial system of public education." Id. at 435. He stressed the command in Brown II
to "effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system", Green, 391 U.S.
at 435, and said that it is in light of that mandate that New Kent County's
freedom-of-choice plan must be measured. Id.
He further emphasized and admonished the School Board that Brown II had placed
on school boards and officials "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch." Id. at 437. That burden had not changed, the Justice said:
"The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Id. While the Court did
not assert that freedom-of-choice plans would never work, it made clear that New Kent
County's plan was not working where 85% of the black students were totally segregated
in an all-black school. Id. The Court served notice that in the future "school plans would
be judged not on paper or promise, but on performance." Green, 391 U.S. at 437.
43478 U.S. 385 (1986). In Bazemore, the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service,
a division of the School of Agriculture and Life Sciences of North Carolina State
University, maintained segregated 4-H and Homemaker Clubs prior to enactment of
the Civil Rights Acts of 1964. Id. at 407. In response, to the Act, the Service discontinued
its segregated club policy and opened the clubs "to any otherwise eligible person
regardless of race." Id. Nevertheless, there remained many all-white and all-black clubs.
Id. Consequently, employees and members of 4-H and Homemaker Clubs brought suit
against the Service, alleging a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in
employment and provision of services in violation of the Constitution and certain
federal statutes. Id. at 386-87. The United States intervened. Bazernore, 498 U.S. at 391.
After a lengthy trial, the district court entered judgment for respondents in all
respects and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. The private
petitioners appealed the rejection of their claim that respondents unlawfully provided
services and materials to segregated 4-H and Homemaker Clubs, framing that question
as follows: "May North Carolina satisfy its obligation to desegregate the de jure system
of 4-H Clubs and Extension Homemaker Clubs by adopting a freedom of choice plan
that fails?" Id. at 386. The United States did not appeal the decisions of the district and
circuit courts on this issue. Id. at 393.
The district court found no evidence of any discrimination after 1964 and
concluded that any current racial imbalance existing in any of the clubs "was the result
of wholly voluntary and unfettered choice of private individuals." Id. at 407. The court
of appeals upheld the findings of the district court and affirmed. Bazemiore, 478 U.S. at
407-08. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court also affirmed, saying: 'In view of the
District Court's findings, this case presents no current violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment since the Service has discontinued its prior discriminatory practices and
has adopted a wholly neutral admissions policy. The mere continued existence of
single-race clubs does not make out a constitutional violation." Id. at 408.
Distinguishing the circumstances in Bazernore from those in Green, the majority
noted that membership in the 4-H and Homemaker Clubs "is entirely voluntary," as
opposed to compulsory public school education. Id. The Court further noted that "while
school boards customarily have the power to create school attendance areas and
[Vo1.'42:377
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ASTA). 44 Judge Biggers, in choosing to apply Bazemore and ASTA rather than
Green, measured Mississippi's affirmative duty to dismantle its racially dual
otherwise designate the school students may attend, "there is no statutory or regulatory
authority to deny a young person the right to join any Club he or she wishes to join." Id.
The Court specifically found Green to be inapplicable to the voluntary associations
supported by the Extension Service, stating "however sound Green may have been in
the context of the public schools, it has no application to this wholly different milieu."
Id. In short, the Court found that discontinuing prior discriminatory practices and
adopting neutral admission policies is all the Constitution requires. Bazemore, 478 U.S.
at 408.
Petitioners argued that Department of Agriculture regulations required that the
Extension Service "take 'affirmative action' to overcome the effects of prior
discrimination in its programs." Id. The majority dismissed this position, saying "the
Service has taken affirmative action to change its policy and to establish what is
concededly a nondiscriminatory admissions system .. " Id. Justice White noted the
United States position that the Extension Service had fully complied with the regulation,
thus, "in view of thedeference due the Department's interpretation of its own regulation,
we cannot accept petitioner's submission that the regulation has been violated." Id.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented
strongly, criticizing the majority for joining the Extension Service "in winking at the
Constitution's requirement that States end their history of segregative practices ... " Id.
Justice Brennan further criticized Justice White's terse opinion which offered "only
feeble excuses for this departure from the Court's historic commitment to the eradication
of segregation in this country." Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 409-10.
Questioning the majority's holding that Green did not apply to the Extension
Service Clubs, Justice Brennan argued, "[wihile I agree that the remedy ultimately
provided might properly vary in different contexts, I can see no justification in logic or
precedent for relieving the State of the overall obligation to desegregate in one context
while imposing that obligation in another." Id. at 419. Rejecting the majority's basis for
its holding on the non-compulsory nature of the activities in question, he further said,
Nothing in our earlier cases suggests that the State's obligation to
desegregate is confined only to those activities in which members of
the public are compelled to participate. On the contrary, it is clear that
the State's obligation to desegregate formerly segregated entities extends
beyond those programs where participation is compulsory to voluntary
public amenities such as parks and recreational facilities.
Id. at 418 (citations omitted).
Justice Brennan also addressed the governing regulations for Title VI, which
require that "'[i]n administering a program where the recipient has previously
discriminated against persons on the grounds of race, . . . the recipient must take
affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination."' Id. at 412 (citing
C.F.R. § 15.3(b)(6)(i) (1985)). Justice Brennan disagreed with the position of the majority
that a mere change in policy constitutes affirmative action because "it is absurd to
contend that the requirement that States take 'affirmative action' is satisfied when the
Extension Service simply declares a neutral admissions policy and refrains from illegal
segregative activities." Id. at 414.
44289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968), affd per curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969). ASTA was
the first case after Green to address the extent of the affirmative duty of a state to
disestablish a dual system of higher education. Plaintiffs sought to prevent the State of
Alabama from constructing and operating a four-year degree granting branch of
Auburn University in the City of Montgomery. Id. at 785. The proposed site for the
branch was close to Alabama State Teachers College, a four year undergraduate
institution previously designated for black students. Id. at 786. Plaintiffs argued that
1993-94]
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system of higher education by determining whether the state had implemented
in good faith nondiscriminatory policies and procedures. 45 He did not impose
upon the state the further obligation of achieving any specified degree of racial
balance in its public colleges and universities.
The district court rested its decision to apply the ASTAlBazemore standard
upon the element of free choice available in higher education, distinguishing
it from the compulsory nature of elementary/secondary schooling:
As is apparent from a contextual reading of Green and subsequent
Supreme Court and lower court decisions considering the nature and
extent of the state's duty to desegregate at the elementary and
secondary level, the affirmative duty as delineated in these cases rests
upon the traditional power vested in local school authorities to dictate
attendance patterns in compulsory elementary and secondary school
systems, that is, to order certain students to attend certain schools. The
circumstances in the higher education field, however, are different.
46
Judge Biggers then distinguished the affirmative duty of the state to bring
about integration in elementary/secondary schools as opposed to
colleges/universities. "Where 'choice' is traditionally controlled by the state,
in elementary and secondary education, the state is required to exercise its
control in a way which maximizes the racial integration of component
institutions."47 The success or failure of the state in desegregating
since the State of Alabama had historically operated a de jure dual system of higher
education, which remained largely intact, the precedents from elementary/secondary
cases imposed on the State an affirmative duty "to utilize new construction or expansion
of [higher education] facilities . . ." to maximize desegregation and effectuate the
dismantling of the dual system. Id. at 787. Constructing and operating a branch of
predominantly and historically white Auburn University within seven miles of
predominantly and historically black Alabama State Teachers College, plaintiffs
asserted, would not maximize desegregation, but would serve to increase racial
disparity of students and faculty between the two schools. Id.
The three-judge district court judicially noticed that Alabama had traditionally
operated a dual system of higher education; found as a fact that the segregated system
had not been fully dismantled; and held that the state had an affirmative duty to
dismantle the system. ASTA, 289 F. Supp. at 787. The court refused, however, to extend
the scope of the duty to desegregate in higher education as far as it had been extended
in the elementary/secondary area. Id. Instead, it restricted the affirmative duty to
racially neutral admission policies and faculty desegregation. Id. at 789-90. The court
held that "as long as the State and a particular institution are dealing with admissions,
faculty and staff in good faith the basic requirement of the affirmative duty to dismantle
the dual school system on the college level . . . is satisfied." Id. The Supreme Court
affirmed the district court opinion with two dissents. Alabama State Teacher's Ass'n v.
Alabama Pub. School & College Auth., 393 U.S. 400 (1969).
45Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1564.
46 1d. at 1552.
47 1d.
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elementary/secondary schools is then measured by the results achieved
because the state has direct official control over attendance decisions.48
"In the college and university education context, however, where individuals
have traditionally enjoyed free choice as to whether and when to attend
school", courts have not measured the success or failure of a state's efforts to
abolish dual systems of higher education by measuring the relative degree of
integration in each of its public colleges and universities.49 The wisdom of this
approach, said Judge Biggers, rests on the qualitative distinctions existing
between post-secondary and elementary/secondary education systems.
Elementary and secondary schools in a single district tend to be fusible in
the sense that they generally strive towards uniformity in offerings, facilities
and services. The opposite is true in higher education. A special emphasis is
placed upon the relative uniqueness of the separate institutions comprising a
public system of higher education. Indeed, the uniqueness of size, location,
faculty and students found at each institution, explains why freedom of choice
is so valued and why the courts have not required the restriction of student
choice in higher education.50
Measuring the current actions of the defendants against the remedial
standards of ASTA and Bazemore, the district court found that the State of
Mississippi had fulfilled its affirmative duty to disestablish the former de jure
segregated system of higher education and dismissed the case.51 From this
dismissal, plaintiffs appealed.
The Fifth Circuit panel reversed and remanded for remedial proceedings. 52
The divided panel specifically rejected the district court's reading of the
mandates of Green53 and adopted instead the interpretation applied by the
481d. at 1554.
491d.
50Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1554. Judge Biggers labored over the distinction between
higher and elementary/secondary education because of Judge John Minor Wisdom's
opinion in United States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.1966),
corrected, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967) (per curiam). Judge
Wisdom's critical premise in Jefferson County was that school boards had a positive duty
to integrate, not merely to stop segregating. Jefferson County, 372 F.2d at 896. A shift from
racial to nonracial criteria in admissions and the presence of a few blacks in formerly
all-white schools was not sufficient. The purpose of school desegregation was to redress
the damage inflicted on the mass of blacks down through the generations by segregated
schools. According to Judge Wisdom, what the state had done, it must undo.
Appropriate remedies now required "liquidation of the state's system of de jure
segregation and the organized undoing of the effects of past segregation." Id. at 866. To
escape such a plain mandate for desegregation, Judge Biggers makes an elaborate
distinction between elementary/secondary education to which Judge Wisdom's
opinion was addressed and higher education, which was the issue in Ayers. Id.
5lAyers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1564.
52Ayers 11, 893 F.2d at 756.
53 1d. at 744. The Fifth Circuit panel described the district court's application of the
law as being based on "an alternative reading of Green," which "requires a state to
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Sixth Circuit in Geier v. Alexander, holding that "a state has an affirmative duty
to eliminate all of the 'vestiges' of de jure segregation, root and branch, in a
university setting."54
Writing for the panel majority in Ayers II, Judge Goldberg adopted much of
the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Geier. He described the message of Brown
I to be that "constitutional doctrine must commandeer a social mission to
eradicate the stigma conveyed through racial separation by law," 55 and the
message of Brown II to be that all effects of de jure segregation must be removed.
"Otherwise, the perceptions of black students would remain distorted and the
moral aspirations of 'separate is inherently unequal'-the attainment of human
implement, in good faith, race neutral policies and procedures instead of uprooting the
vestiges of segregation root and branch." Id. at 743.
541d. at 744 (quoting Geier v. Alexander, 801 F.2d 799,804 (6th Cir. 1986). Geier arose
after fifteen years of litigation growing out of Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937
(M.D. Tenn. 1968), enforced sub nom. Geier v. Dunn, 337 F. Supp. 573 (M.D. Tenn. 1972),
modified sub nom. Geier v. University of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 886 (1979), a suit filed in 1968 seeking desegregation of public institutions of higher
learning in Tennessee. All parties except the United States entered into a consent decree
approving the use of preferential "racial quotas" to aid in eliminating residual effects of
dejure segregation. 801 F.2d at800-01. The Department of Justice argued that the quotas
deprived nonminority students of equal protection. Id. at 804. The Justice Department
also insisted that Green's mandate requiring the elimination of all vestiges of past
discrimination "root and branch" did not apply to higher education. Further, "since
higher education is a voluntary activity, a state satisfies the Constitution by putting an
end to discriminatory practices, and has no obligation to eliminate the vestiges of past
discrimination." Id. The principle authority relied upon by the Department of Justice
was Bazemore. Id.
The Sixth Circuit declined to find Bazemore controlling and reaffirmed its earlier
decision in Geier that Green was the law of the case:
The Green requirement of an affirmative duty applies to public higher
education as well as to education at the elementary and secondary
school levels. Nothing in the Bazemore decision, where the compelling
interest of a state in the education of its citizenry was not involved,
requires us to reexamine these holdings.
Id. at 805 (citation omitted).
Rooting its opinion in the distinction between "clubs" dealt with in Bazemore and
"education" in Green, the Sixth Circuit said:
[I]t appears fallacious to attempt to extend Bazemore to any level of
education. While membership in 4-H and Homemaker Clubs offers a
valuable experience to young people and families, particularly in rural
areas, it cannot be compared to the value of an advanced education.
The importance of education to the individual and the interest of the
state in having its young people educated as completely as possible
indicate clearly that the holding in Green rather than that of Bazemore
applies.
Ayers , 893 F.2d at 805.
5SAyers H, 893 F.2d at 749.
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dignity for all-would be impugned."56 Turning in his analysis to Green, Judge
Goldberg wrote:
Under Green the creation of a unitary school system is the goal, a goal
tantamount to the elimination of the effects of de jure discrimination,
root and branch. If a less demanding standard were adopted, images
of inferiority would be memorialized with the force of law, contrary to
the vision of Brown, because vestiges of discrimination would remain
unaddressed. Brown commands the application of Green in all of its
fertility to the public university forum.57
He then sharply criticized the district court's interpretation of Green as
requiring only that a state implement in good faith, race-neutral policies and
procedures in order to discharge its constitutional responsibilities, and the
district court's holding that the open admissions policy of Mississippi's public
universities satisfied that standard. 58 It assumes:
Black students possess the same freedom to choose as do white
students. Contrary to Brown, however, this assumption ignores the
effects of past de jure segregation... Brown explicitly recognized that
vestiges of de jure segregation distort the perceptions of blacks. Blacks
do not, therefore, make choices from a tabula rasa. Instead, they choose
against a history of racial subjugation with its attendant messages of
inferiority.59
The opinion then criticized the district court and the five member majority
in Bazemore for finding the searching inquiry of Green applicable only if
attendance at a particular institution is legally compelled. "Brown stated that
the stigmatizing effects of segregation are not created by legally compelled
attendance but rather from the vestiges of legally compelled separation. Thus,
the lesson of Brown is that the malignancy of apartheid does not vanish in
state-sponsored forums simply because attendance is voluntary and
admittance race-neutral." 60
Following the Fifth Circuit panel's holding that defendants had not satisfied
their affirmative duty under Green,61 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted
defendant's motion for rehearing en banc.62 On rehearing, a divided court
vacated the panel decision and affirmed the district court, concluding that
"Mississippi has adopted and implemented race neutral policies for operating
561d. at 750.
571d.
581d.
591d. at 751.
6OAyers II, 893 F.2d at 751.
61id. at 756.
62 Ayers v. Allain, 898 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1990).
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its colleges and universities and that all students have real freedom of choice
to attend the college or university they wish..."63
In reaching this result, the court first analyzed the scope of Mississippi's duty
to remedy the effects of past de jure discrimination. At the outset, it remarked
that a state's "precise constitutional obligation" as to its higher education
system had not been "so clearly defined as in cases involving primary and
secondary education," where school authorities had been charged by Green
with eliminating all vestiges of state imposed segregation and taking whatever
steps are necessary to convert to a unitary system.64 Outside the
elementary/secondary context, however, a different standard was set forth in
Bazemore requiring the governing authorities only to discontinue prior
discriminatory practices and adopt in good faith racially-neutral policies.
65
The en banc majority determined that, because of the
free-choice/non-compulsory nature of education at the post-secondary level,
Bazemore provided the proper standard for desegregation of public universities,
and that Mississippi had satisfied that standard.66 "We therefore hold that to
fulfill its affirmative duty to disestablish its prior system of de jure segregation
in higher education, the state of Mississippi satisfies its constitutional
obligation by discontinuing prior discriminatory practices and adopting and
implementing good-faith, race-neutral polices and procedures."
67
Three courts in Mississippi struggled with the question of what is the
appropriate standard for a state to determine whether or not it has fulfilled its
affirmative duty to desegregate its public colleges and universities. Two of
three, the District Court and the en banc court, arrived at the same conclusion:
a state fulfills its affirmative duty to desegregate its public colleges and
universities once it discontinues its prior discriminatory practices and adopts
race neutral policies. The United States Supreme Court finally weighed in with
its view in June of 1992 in United States v. Fordice.68
The Supreme Court addressed two major questions in the Fordice decision.
First, the Court articulated the appropriate standard to apply in deciding
whether Mississippi had fulfilled its obligation to dismantle its prior de jure
segregated system of higher education.69 Second, after determining the
63 Ayers III, 914 F.2d at 678.
641d. at 682.
65 Id.
66Id. at 687.
671d. Both the private plaintiffs and the United States filed Petitions for Writ of
Certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted; see United States v. Mabus, 499 U.S. 958
(1991) (reflecting the election of Ray Mabus as governor at the time the Petition was
filed; the caption was later changed to Fordice due to the election of governor Kirk
Fordice).
68 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
691d. at 2732.
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appropriate standard, the Court applied the standard to determine whether
Mississippi had in fact fulfilled "its affirmative duty to dismantle its prior dual
university system."70 The Supreme Court initiated its discussion about the
appropriate standard by noting that "[o]ur decisions establish that a State does
not discharge its constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies and
practices traceable to its prior de jure dual system that continue to foster
segregation. Thus, we have consistently asked whether existing racial
identifiability is attributable to the State ......71
This theme was considerably different from the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision, below, that the State had met its affirmative duty to
disestablish a dual educational system by adopting and implementing
race-neutral policies to govern the higher education system. The Fifth Circuit
concluded that students in the higher education arena, in contrast to those in
elementary and secondary schools, have "real freedom" to choose where they
will attend school.72
The Supreme Court agreed that there were major differences between higher
education and elementary and secondary schools, but it did not agree that the
constitutional duty to desegregate was different. The Court reasoned that
attendance at universities is a matter of choice. 73 The State does not assign
students to universities. Moreover, the "remedies common to public school
desegregation, such as pupil assignments, busing, attendance quotas, and
zoning, are unavailable when persons may freely choose whether to pursue an
advanced education and, when the choice is made, which of several
universities to attend."74
The matter of choice discussion, however, was virtually the only part of the
Fifth Circuit's opinion with which the Supreme Court agreed. Significantly, the
Supreme Court did not agree with either the appeals court or the district court's
holding that the adoption of race-neutral policies alone "demonstrate[s] that
the State has completely abandoned its prior dual system."75
The Supreme Court focused on the variety of factors that may influence a
student's choice. The Court said admissions policies or faculty hiring policies
do not solely determine student attendance. 76 Moreover, the question of choice
has little to do with whether or not race-neutral policies operate to cure a
constitutionally invalid system.77 The differences between the remedies
70 Id. at 2735.
7 11d.
72Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2736.
731d.
74Id.
751d.
76Id.
77Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2736.
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available to elementary and secondary institutions as compared to institutions
of higher education are indeed significant. However, it is constitutionally
inconsistent to contend that the element of choice requires a different
constitutional standard to determine whether the Brown mandate to remove all
vestiges of prior segregated systems is being achieved. The Court emphasized
that even if segregative policies are repealed, "there may still be state action that
is traceable to the State's prior de jure segregation and that continues to foster
segregation."78 If such policies and practices still exist, they must be eradicated
"to the extent practicable and consistent with sound educational practices. "79
Both lower courts recognized some debate regarding the appropriate
standard to apply. The debate resulted because the Supreme Court had
previously adopted several standards from which courts could choose
including Green, ASTA, and Bazemore.80 Both the district court and the court of
appeals adopted Bazemore and ASTA as the proper standard to apply.
The Supreme Court in Fordice disagreed with the State's argument that the
district court and court of appeals properly followed Bazemore.81 The Court
distinguished Bazemore from Fordice by citing the district court's factual
findings in Bazemore that the Extension Service had completely abandoned its
prior policy of segregation. In contrast, the Fordice Court found substantial
effects of de jure segregation, with only limited State efforts to remedy the past
effects of this segregation.82 In Bazemore, the Supreme Court's analysis
determined that Green did not apply only after the Court was convinced that
the State had not played a part in perpetuating the racial identifiability of the
Clubs.
Given the tension between Bazemore/ASTA and Green, the Court announced
a new standard:
If the state perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its prior
system that continue to have segregative effects-whether by
influencing student enrollment decisions or by fostering segregation
in other facets of the university system-and such policies are without
sound educational justification and can be practicably eliminated, the
State has not satisfied its burden of proving that it has dismantled its
prior system.
83
The Court reasoned that had the lower courts applied the proper standard,
they would have found several aspects of Mississippi's system of higher
781d.
79Id.
80391 U.S. 430 (1968); 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968), affd, 393 U.S. 400 (1969) (per
curian); 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
81Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2737.
821d. at 2734-37.
83 1d. at 2737.
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education constitutionally suspect. The Supreme Court commanded that
Mississippi either justify these policies and practices or eliminate them.84
Among these policies and practices were admissions policies, mission
assignments, program duplication, and the existence of eight universities.85
The most extended analysis of the four policies came in the examination of
student admission. The system uses a single factor for admission-ACT scores.
Automatic admission occurs when a student achieves a certain composite
score. However, the required scores (at least 13) for admission to the HBUs are
different from the scores (at least 15) required at the HWUs. The Court
concluded that "[t]he present admission standards are not only traceable to the
de jure system and were originally adopted for a discriminatory purpose, but
they also have present discriminatory effects." 86
At the district court, the plaintiffs argued that the Board used the ACT as a
tool to segregate blacks and whites within the state system of higher
education.87 The plaintiffs contended that the ACT requirement was adopted
by the Board as a direct result of the admission application of James Meredith.88
The plaintiffs also argued that the Board's ACT requirements for different
schools channeled blacks to HBUs and whites to HWUs. Moreover, the
plaintiffs argued that the Board failed to follow the ACT program policies by
not considering both high school grades and ACT test scores.89
The district court found that the ACT "was in fact adopted '... . because of,
not merely in spite of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group,' [but that]
much time has passed since 1962 and much has transpired with respect to the
Board of Trustees' student admissions policies."90 The court noted that the
Board adopted the minimum ACT scores in 1976 with valid nondiscriminatory
reasons.9 1 The district court said that there were valid concerns by the Board
regarding "the level of scholastic preparation of entering freshman."92
In response to the channeling argument raised by the plaintiffs, Judge
Biggers found that the Board could not adopt uniform ACT requirements for
84 Id. at 2738.
85 Id.
8 6Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2738-39.
8 7Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1554.
881d. at 1565.
891d.
90 d. (quoting Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
9lAyers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1555. While the Board did not adopt minimum ACT
requirements until 1976, Judge Biggers also determined that in 1961 the Board
authorized each institution to adopt its own minimum ACT requirements. In 1963, the
three comprehensive institutions adopted ACT minimums of 15. University of Southern
Mississippi and Mississippi State University admitted their first black students in 1965
and 1967, respectively. Id. at 1531.
92 d. at 1555.
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all eight universities because of the "deleterious impact upon institutional
enrollments, particularly at the three historically black institutions.. ."93 He
said a minimum ACT score of fifteen would "decimate" enrollment at black
institutions.94 The district court also found that the difference between ACT
scores at HBUs and HWUs had significantly narrowed over the years. 95
In response to the plaintiff's argument regarding failure to use both high
school grades and ACT scores, Judge Biggers found that the Board had valid
concerns about grade inflation and the "lack of comparability in grading
practices and course offerings among Mississippi's diverse high schools." 96 The
district court found that the ACT organization considered the ACT score singly
or in conjunction with grades to provide "a sound indicator of the level of
preparation and the likelihood of success at the freshman level .... "97 Thus, the
district court concluded that the Board adopted these practices for "legitimate
educational and fiscal concerns .... 98
Judge Biggers recognized the differences between ACT scores for
Mississippi's black and white students, but noted that the minimum scores
were set at very modest levels.99 He stated that ninety-five percent of ACT test
takers score nine or above and seventy percent score fifteen or above.100 Thus,
the district court concluded that absent any proof of intentional discrimination
neither Title VI nor the Fourteenth Amendment required the state to modify its
admissions criteria due to a disparate impact on minority students.101 Judge
Biggers believed that if the admissions standards were valid, "enjoining [their]
use would not.., counteract the effects of past segregation, but might simply
serve to perpetuate a dual standard, ... by reinforcing the stereotype that
minority students cannot satisfy generally applicable educational standards
and by diluting educational benefits offered to all students, black and white."102
931d.
941d. Judge Biggers found that nine was the average ACT score of a black high school
student applying to college in Mississippi.
95Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1555.
96 1d. What this lack of comparability suggests is a much larger, statewide education
problem at all levels. Almost every other college in the country utilizes a variety of
factors in admissions standards, including high school grades. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2740.
Professor Robert Davis says, "For Mississippi to dismiss high school grades because of
their grading practices is a different way of saying we have no confidence in the job we
are doing of educating our young people." Davis, supra note 9, at 433 n. 190.
9 7Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1555-56.
9 8 d. at 1556.
991d.
10OId.
101Id.
102Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1557.
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Judge Biggers was not persuaded by the plaintiff's channeling argument. He
said the composite score of fifteen at HWUs and thirteen at HBUs did not
significantly contribute to "racial identifiability of Mississippi universities."103
Judge Biggers noted that HBUs were not black because black students were
"channeled" to HBUs after failing to achieve the requisite ACT score,104 and
that, "practically all the black students who applied to predominantly white
universities in the Fall of 1986 were accepted." 105 Thus, the district court
concluded that the Board's admissions policies for the state institutions of
higher learning were reasonable and educationally sound.106
In the Supreme Court's view, this conclusion missed the mark regarding the
disproportionate impact the ACT automatic admission policies had on
minority students.107 The Supreme Court held, "without doubt, these
requirements restrict the range of choices of entering students as to which
institution they may attend in a way that perpetuates segregation."108 The
Court noted that in 1985 "seventy-two percent of Mississippi's white high
school seniors achieved an ACT composite score of fifteen or better, while less
than thirty percent of black high school seniors earned that score."109
The Supreme Court noted that the "segregative effects"110 of the automatic
entrance policy are particularly troublesome when the HBUs entrance
requirements are compared with other regional institutions.111 For example,
Mississippi University for Women and Delta State University are both
designated as regional institutions with eighteen and fifteen ACT minimums
for automatic admission, respectively.112 In contrast, Alcom State University
and Mississippi Valley State University, two historically black regional
institutions, have a thirteen ACT minimum for automatic admissions. 113 The
Supreme Court asserted that the district court basically concluded it is
acceptable to maintain lower ACT levels at HBUs because blacks do not
perform as well as whites on standardized tests. The courts below did not
realize that they endorsed a dual educational system. Many Mississippians are
103Id.
104Id.
105Id. at 1557.
106Id.
107Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2739.
1081d.; see David E. Kendall, Note, The Affirmative Duty to Integrate in Higher Education,
79 YALE L.J. 666 (1970) (arguing need for judicial standards to measure state compliance
with desegregation).
109Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2739.
110ld.
111Id.
112Id.
113Id.
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comfortable with the way things are, and thus believe that the way things are,
is the way things should be. Thus, the district court concerned itself with
defending why HWUs and HBUs remained as they were, through no fault of
the State's admissions policies, rather than questioning the practicality of
eliminating the differences in entrance requirements.11 4
The Supreme Court had difficulty with two additional arguments of the
State's admissions policies. First, the Court did not understand why the
difference in program missions between institutions necessarily justified
different admissions requirements. 115 The Court was particularly disturbed
here because the "differential admission standards are remnants of the dual
system with a continuing discriminatory effect, and the mission assignments
to some degree follow the historical racial assignments.116
Second, the Court found the disregard for high school grades educationally
unsound in making admissions decisions.117 The ACT program officials
advised against relying solely on the test scores because the test score alone
does not present a complete picture of the students' aptitude for college work.
Indeed, the Supreme Court cited an ACT program report that said, "it would
be foolish to substitute a three or four-hour test in place of a student's high
school grades as a means of predicting college performance."118 Moreover, the
Court noted that the gap between black and white high school grades was
much narrower than that between their average ACT scores. 119
The Board's concern with grade inflation and disparate grading practices
among high schools persuaded the district court and court of appeals.
However, the Supreme Court concluded that "because the ACT requirement
was originally adopted for discriminatory purposes, the current requirement
is traceable to that decision and seemingly continues to have segregative
effects." 120 Thus, "the State needs to demonstrate that the 'ACT-only' admission
standard is not susceptible to elimination without eroding sound educational
policy."121 Therefore, the "ACT-only" admissions policy adopted by the State
had its origins in a de jure system and was not justified by any good educational
reason. 122
ll 4Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2739.
115Id. at 2739.
1161d. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court and found
that the disparities among the schools were reminiscent of the former de jure segregated
system but that the policies were no longer racially motivated. Ayers III, 914 F.2d at 692.
117Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2740.
1181d.
1191d.
1201d.
121Id.
122Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2740.
[Vol. 42:377
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/8
DESEGREGATION AS A TWO-WAY STREET
The duplication of undergraduate and graduate programs among HBUs and
HWUs also concerned the Supreme Court.123 Despite the district court's
finding that almost thirty-five percent of the undergraduate programs at HBUs
were duplicated by HWUs and ninety percent of the graduate programs at
HBUs were duplicated by HWUs,124 it concluded that there was no proof that
duplication was related to the racial identifiability of the schools. 125 The district
court concluded that the plaintiffs had offered no proof that eliminating
program duplication would affect student choice or be educationally
justifiable.126 Another problem for the Court arose because the district court
appeared to place on the plaintiffs the burden of proof to show duplication
contributed to the segregative effects. 127
The district court's placing the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to meet an
unformulated legal standard troubled the Supreme Court.128 Brown, however,
required that the burden of proof was on the State to establish that it had
eliminated its prior de jure system.129 Thus, the district court improperly shifted
the burden of proving the elimination of a constitutional defect from the State
to the individual plaintiffs. 130 The district court acknowledged that this
duplication was wasteful but said, "this case is not about the efficiency or the
economic wisdom of higher education policies. It is about the charge of racial
discrimination in higher education." 131 The Supreme Court concluded that "it
can hardly be denied that such duplication was part and parcel of the prior
dual system of higher education-the whole notion of 'separate but equal'
required duplicative programs in two sets of schools .... "132 The Supreme
Court also noted that the district court should not have treated the issue of
program duplication in isolation from other policies.133
Some of these other policies included the Institutional Mission Designations.
On November 19, 1981, the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher
1231d.
124Id.
12SId. at 2741.
126/d.
127Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2741.
1281d.
129Id.
130/d.
13lAyers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1541.
132Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2741.
133Id.
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Learning adopted mission statements for all eight of its universities. 134 The
premise of these statements were:
The general purpose of mission statements is to provide appropriate
differential roles of various state universities. The general object shall
be quality performance of assigned and approved program endeavors.
All programs are subject to periodic review by the Board of Trustees in
terms of need, viable size and effective performance. Based upon
program reviews, the role and scope of any university may be adjusted
from time to time.
135
Any new program outside the scope of these mission statements required
"extraordinary justification" before consideration by the Board. 136
The plaintiffs argued in the lower court that the 1981 allocation of missions
perpetuated the effects of de jure discrimination. 137 They contended that the
designated comprehensive institutions were ensured of receiving a greater part
of the limited resources. 138 Thus, the plaintiffs asserted that the State should
disregard the mission designations and enhance the HBUs programs in order
to equalize HBUs with HWUs. 139
The plaintiffs' argument failed to persuade the district court. Moreover, the
argument had strong separate but equal overtones reminiscent of Plessy v.
Ferguson.140 Judge Biggers concluded that the mission statements were
legitimately justified as an effort to "conserve scarce educational resources."141
The Supreme Court concluded that because the mission designations were
based on policies enacted during de jure segregation, the existence of different
missions for different universities "limits to some extent an entering student's
choice as to which university to seek admittance."142
Given the role of each institution in the state prior to 1954, one would have
no difficulty in concluding, as the Supreme Court concluded, that the mission
assignments and designations continue to perpetuate a racially unequal educa-
134 Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Leaming, Mission Statements, 1
app. A, Nov. 19,1981 [hereinafter Mission Statements].
1 3 5 Id.
13 6 1d.
137Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1560.
13 8 Id.
1 3 9 Id.
140163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Supreme Court upheld a Louisianan law
segregating blacks and whites on railroad cars as a valid exercise of the State's police
power and this law did not interfere with interstate commerce. Id. at 548. This decision
stamped judicial approval on the doctrine of separate but equal. Id.
14lAyers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1561.
14 2 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2742.
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tional system.143 This racially unequal system originated with the initial
chartering of the schools. Even though the district court found that the 1974
Plan of Compliance assigned institutional missions based on "financial
resources,"144 one cannot ignore the historical limitations under which HBUs
originally developed.145
The final policy examined by the Supreme Court was the Board's
maintenance of eight universities. The Court noted that eight universities in
the State clearly related to the prior de jure system.146 The Court also
emphasized the district court's recognition that "maintaining all eight
universities in Mississippi is wasteful and irrational." 147 The district court
stated:
The issues of this case are not about the inefficiency for example of
having two state universities only 20 miles apart in the eastern part of
the state with separate administrations and duplicating programs, and
two state universities on the western side of the state only 50 miles
apart, each with separate administrations and duplicating programs.
The issues are not about the economic efficiency of funding
traditionally black and traditionally white universities which
duplicate as many as 75% of each other's baccalaureate programs....
Nor do the issues deal with the attempt by the state to maintain three
comprehensive universities which compete with each other for the
financial resources available, when larger surrounding states with
larger higher education budgets maintain only one premier
comprehensive university per state. What the issues of this case are
about are the Constitution and the laws of the United States as they
apply to the offering of higher education by the State of Mississippi to
its citizens and whether any practices or policies of the state in the
higher education field are racially motivated to bring about results
which deprive black citizens of benefits provided to white citizens.148
Thus, Judge Biggers held that the Board adopted race-neutral policies and
complied fully with its "affirmative duty to disestablish the former de jure
segregated system of higher education."149 He conceded that the Board funded
1431d.
144Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1539.
145 See Kujovich, supra note 12.
146Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2742.
1471d.
148Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1563-64.
1491d. at 1564.
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more schools than for which it had the available resources. However, 
he said
that was a legislative decision that affects the quality of the 
institutions.150
The Supreme Court, citing United States v. Louisiana,
151 said that the record
was too incomplete to determine whether closure of one or more 
schools would
be necessary.152 The Court said it may be possible to cure 
the constitutional
violation by eliminating program duplication and changing 
the admissions
requirements.153 The Supreme Court's instructions on this 
point were clear.
The Court said,
[O]n remand this issue should be carefully explored by inquiring and
determining whether retention of all eight institutions 
itself affects
student choice and perpetuates the segregated higher 
education
system, whether maintenance of each of the universities 
is
educationally justifiable, and whether one or more of them can be
practicably closed or merged with other 
existing institutions.
154
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that students in Mississippi 
do not have
true free choice in college institutions because of the connection 
between a prior
dejure system and current segregative policies.
155 The Court placed the burden
on the State to take the necessary steps to dismantle the prior 
system and ensure
that student choice becomes truly free.
156 To meet this obligation, the Court
held that the "full range of policies and practices 
must be examined."'157
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor emphasized 
that the State of
Mississippi has the burden to prove that it has undone 
its prior segregation.
"The circumstances in which a state may maintain a policy 
or practice traceable
to de jure segregation that has segregative effects are narrow."
158 Using the
State's own "good faith" argument, Justice O'Connor suggested: 
"Where the
State can accomplish legitimate educational objectives through less segregative
means, the courts may infer a lack of good faith . . ."159 She 
concluded with the
position that "if the State shows that maintenance of certain 
remnants of its
prior system is essential to accomplish its legitimate goals, 
then it still must
150Id.
151718 F. Supp. 499, 514 (E.D. La. 1989). The United States District Court 
ordered a
restructuring of Louisiana's higher education system in order 
to desegregate a prior de
jure system. Id. The merger of two state law schools was part of the restructuring. 
Id.
152Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2743.
153Id.
154Id.
1551d.
15 61d.
157Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2743.
1581d.
159Id. at 2744.
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prove that it has counteracted and minimized the segregative impact of such
policies to the extent possible."160
Justice Thomas wrote separately to emphasize the difference between the
standard announced by the majority and the Green standard used in the
grade-school context. The differences in the standard would allow the
continuation of HBUs: "In particular, because it does not compel the
elimination of all observed racial imbalance, it portends neither the destruction
of historically black colleges nor the severing of those institutions from their
distinctive histories and traditions."161
Calling the remedies used for desegregation of grade-schools "radical",
Justice Thomas insisted that the focus of the higher education standard is on
the "specific policies alleged to produce racial imbalance, rather than on the
imbalance itself."162 He noted that "[a]s a practical matter, then, the district courts
administering our standard will spend their time determining whether such
policies have been adequately justified-a far narrower, more manageable task
than that imposed under Green."163
Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter. However, he did agree with the majority
on the following: First, the Constitution compels Mississippi to remove all
discriminatory barriers to its state-funded universities. Second, the
Constitution does not compel Mississippi to remedy funding disparities
between its HBUs and HWUs. Finally, Mississippi's ACT program
requirements need further review.164
His dissent critiqued placement of the burden of proof on all formerly dejure
public higher education systems which requires them to show that they are in
compliance with Brown 1.165 Justice Scalia contended that the burden imposed
by the majority on higher education is too similar to that which is prescribed
for primary and secondary schools. 166 He believed that ruling will do more
harm than good when he said:
What I do predict is a number of years of litigation-driven confusion
and destabilization in the university systems of all formerly de jure
States, that will benefit neither blacks nor whites, neither
predominantly black institutions nor predominantly white ones.
Nothing good will come of this judicially ordained turmoil, except the
public recognition that any Court that would knowingly impose it
160Id.
1611d.
162Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2745.
163Id.
164Id. at 2746.
165Id.
166Id.
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must hate segregation. We must find some other way of making the
point.
167
III. PART II: COMMENTATORS IN THE WHITE COMMUNITy
Many commentators have come forward to propose ways in which states
can desegregate their systems of higher education. Part II examines those
proposals in the white community that respond to the ruling in Fordice. In her
article, The Road to United States v. Fordice: What Is The Duty Of Public Colleges
and Universities In Former De Jure States To Desegregate?, Mary Ann Connell,
despite the ruling in Fordice, argues for maintenance of the status quo.168 As
the University Attorney for the University of Mississippi, Connell joined in the
argument for the respondents which rests on the concept of choice and the
inherent differences between elementary/secondary and higher education.
169
According to Connell, "[This concept] do[es] not diminish the equal education
opportunity mandate of Brown, but simply find[s] that the constitutional
obligation is satisfied with good-faith implementation of nondiscriminatory
policies and procedures." 170
As such, Connell believes that Bazemore is the appropriate standard to apply
in desegregating higher education because it is noncompulsory just as the 4-H
clubs were in Bazemore. She says, "The importance the Court placed on factors
of student assignment, the compulsory nature of the activity, and the state's
power to create or designate student attendance clearly indicates that the
differences in elementary/secondary and higher education matter."171
Connell's position simply put is an argument for maintenance of the status
quo based on a freedom of choice argument. Her position is misguided for two
reasons. First, the numbers clearly demonstrate that desegregation has failed
in the State of Mississippi.172 Second, the Supreme Court concluded that there
is no freedom of choice because the state maintains practices and policies which
fetter choice.173 The numbers in Mississippi tell the story: Ninety-nine percent
of the system's white undergraduate students attended an HWU and
seventy-one percent of the system's black students attended an HBU. 174 With
respect to administrative staff, the HBUs were over ninety-four percent black
16 7Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2753.
16 8See Connell, supra note 10.
16 91d. at 285, 289; see Respondent's Brief at 2, United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727
(1992) (No. 90-65888) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
17OConnell, supra note 10, at 359.
1711d.
172 See Petitioner's Brief at 10-13, United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992) (No.
90-65888) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
173Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2736-37.
174 Petitioners' Brief, supra note 172, at 10.
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and the HWUs were over ninety-eight percent white with Delta State
University, Mississippi University for Women and Mississippi State University
having no black staff.175 In terms of faculty, thirty percent of the faculty
employed by the HBUs were white, while only three percent of the faculty
employed by the HWUs were black.176
These numbers indicate that there is something terribly wrong in the State
of Mississippi forty years after Brown L Insofar as the courts concern themselves
with desegregation, in the face of these numbers, maintenance of the status quo
woefully fails to address this abysmal situation. The Supreme Court, in Fordice,
recognized as much when it determined that Mississippi cannot meet its
burden to affirmatively desegregate the State's schools until the State
eliminates its policies and practices traceable to the former de jure system that
still have segregative effects. 177 In so holding, the Court rejected the freedom
of choice position promulgated by Connell and the State of Mississippi.
Professor Wendy Brown attacks this freedom of choice notion as fallacious.
She says,
In the case of public colleges, it is clear that acquiescence to individual
private judgments serves to mask the state's continued role in
perpetuating the system it created. Because racism is endemic rather
than a deviation from the American norm, the choice of whites to
remain in all-white schools is predictable by the state. Because this
choice is predictable, principles of formal equality-such as good faith
or neutrality-fail to adequately address the norm of racism; rather,
the effect of choice is to perpetuate racial division and deprive blacks
of equal protection.1 78
As Professor Brown demonstrates, the problem with the freedom of choice
argument is that it ignores the fact that "the state's racially motivated conduct
is so inextricably linked with the exercise of individual choice as to be virtually
inseparable." 179 In turn, individual choice is influenced by racism. The coercive
effects of public and private racism lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
exercise of choice by blacks and whites is fettered. 180
1751d. at 12.
176Id.
1 77Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2737.
178Wendy Brown, The Convergence Of Neutrality And Choice: The Limits Of The State's
Affirmative Duty To Provide Equal Educational Opportunity, 60 TENN. L. REV. 63, 72 (1992).
17 91d. According to Professor Brown, "[Tihe power of racism to influence state conduct
and direct individual decisionmaking persists. The coercive effects of state-sponsored
racial subordination linger on and serve to justify and endorse private discriminatory
conduct. State-sponsored segregation and other forms of social exclusion reinforce a
racist ideology that Blacks are simply inferior to whites." Id.
180According to Professor Charles Lawrence, "[Ilnstitutionalized racism pervades all
facets of American life, both public and private." See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the
Eqo and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 318
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Professor Paul Gewirtz argues that choices are never completely free of
constraint.181 In this context, choice is constrained by past governmental
discrimination, and the effects of past discrimination are perpetuated by
choice. Under the "corrective model" discussed by Professor Gewirtz, a choice
system is deficient when the government's intentional discrimination
constrains choice and when the "continuing effects" of government
discrimination constrain or "taint" choice. 182
Connell can argue freedom of choice only by completely ignoring the historic
and current limitations placed by the state on the ability of blacks and whites
to exercise "free choice" in the context of selecting educational institutions. She
erroneously downplays the power and authority that state action gives to the
exclusionary effect of the exercise of fettered choice by both blacks and whites.
In doing so, she denies the equal protection of the laws to both.
There are several ways in which the state's conduct fetters, or interferes with,
the choice of blacks and whites to such an extent that it reveals the state's
culpability for continuing racial segregation. The factors that give individual
choice the color of state action include: the location of predominantly black
and predominantly white colleges in close proximity, the effects of racial
segregation in early eduction, the continued racial identifiability of schools and
the chilling effect created on campus by the failure of schools to help correct
distorted attitudes about race.
Southern states have blatantly accommodated segregationist patterns by
locating two colleges in the same geographic area.183 Much of the litigation
surrounding the desegregation of southern state systems of higher education
has revolved around the issue of whether the construction of new schools, or
improvements to existing institutions, would exacerbate racial segregation by
making it easier for blacks and whites to avoid attending schools predominated
by the other race.184 Moreover, the duplication of programs gives students the
(1987). Professsor Brown says, "Because of its pervasive nature, it is often difficult to
identify or place exactly in either the public or private sphere. Removing the State from
scrutiny, and allowing the composition of each school to be determined on the reasoning
that private decisionmaking is not effected by state conduct, leaves black citizens
without the protection afforded by formal requirements designed to eliminate the
adverse effects of racial prejudice." Brown, supra note 178, at 72. Thus, by advocating
that the state need not remove the continuing vestiges of its past sponsored racism
"would allow for discretionary private judgments based on racial prejudice" to shape
the future of educational opportunities for blacks. Id.
181 Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal,
86 COLuM. L. REV. 741 (1986).
1821d. at 741-42.
183Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1563-64.
184 See, e.g., Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1970),
affd sub nom. Board of Visitors v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971) (the court granted an
injunction sought by blacks against theescalation of an all-white college from a two-year
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opportunity to choose the school where their race predominates. Connell
asserts, as did the district court in Ayers, that neither the duplication of
programs, nor the existence of eight institutions of higher education nor the
creation of branch campuses by Mississippi contributed to the inequities in
funding or perpetuated racial identifiability.185 The Supreme Court, however,
implied that the existence of eight universities perpetuated racial segregation
in higher education in Mississippi.186
In addition to maintaining eight universities, Mississippi also fetters choice
through its admissions policies whereby they predicate admission solely on
the ACT score. Given the pitiful state of secondary education in Mississippi,
especially, in black communities, this admissions policy works to channel black
students to the HBUs. 187 The State could easily avoid such channeling by
considering grades and other factors in the admissions process. This solution
was rejected by the district court.188 Yet, the American College Testing Program
said, "in the case of minority students whose prior educational opportunities
have been limited, it becomes especially appropriate to make use of the total
scope of information-cognitive as well as non-academic-provided by the
ACT assessment."189
By rejecting the ACT's own recommendation for how to use its scores, the
State forecloses an avenue of access to the HWUs for many black students. This
policy also contributes to the continued racial identifiability of the eight
universities in Mississippi. Furthermore, the underfunding of the HBUs
continues their racial identifiability as well. The lack of funding and other
"tangible" support is directly attributable to the State. Other concrete vestiges
of the regime of de jure segregation include the name of the school, 190 school
customs and programs and special events honoring people based on their
contribution to their race. Due to the continued resource disparities and
cultural differences between HWUs and HBUs, whites will choose to attend
to a four-year institution); discussion of A STA, supra note 43; discussion of Sanders, supra
note 53.
185Connell, supra note 10, at 315; Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1561.
186Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2742.
187Mississippi and Louisiana rank near the bottom among the states in the quality of
education provided. See Joel A. Deviant & James D. Wright, Poverty and Politics in
Louisiana, NEw ORLEANS TRIB., Nov. 1991, at 10.
188Ayers 1, 674 F. Supp. at 1556.
1891d.
19 0The nickname "Ole Miss" was a term taken from "the language of the antebellum
Darkie who knew the wife of his owner byno other title than "Ole Miss" which connoted
all the admiration and reverence accorded [white] womanhood of the Old South." Neil
Henry, Ole Miss: Evolution of Racism's Sound and Fury, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1986, at 1.
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the better endowed white colleges and both blacks and whites will continue to
choose schools with cultural atmospheres similar to their own.191
The desire of whites to attend better funded institutions192 coupled with the
difficult and biased admissions standards of the HWUs that prevents blacks
from attending HWUs, precludes blacks and whites from attending school
together and thereby channels their choices in a way that perpetuates a dual
system of education. Not surprisingly, the State intended this result. For
example, at trial, in Ayers, the president of an HWU admitted that the university
did not publicize its affirmative action programs.1 93
As summarized by the Fifth Circuit panel: "The badge of inferiority that
marks black institutions has not been removed. As such, there remains...
vestiges of discrimination which distorts the perceptions of black students. The
racial composition of the student body is not simply the result of student
choice."194 To be untainted by discrimination, a choice system must offer
options that do not reflect the effects of discrimination; this becomes
"impossible" if at the time of choice the schools already have a racial identity
that was created by de jure segregation. 195
The continued segregation of students in Mississippi's schools manifests
itself in the racist attitudes displayed towards blacks on predominantly white
campuses. At trial in Ayers, six black former students of the University of
Mississippi testified about verbal harassment by faculty and students, which
191Evidence introduced at trial in Ayers I showed that whites tended to avoid
predominantly black colleges, even when more convenient geographically, "because of
the continued racial identifiability and stigma of inferiority originally imposed by the
state." See Motion for Leave to File Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education,
Inc., American Civil Liberties Union and The National Conference of Black Lawyers as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 58 n. 88, United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct.
2727 (1992) (No. 90-6588) (letters from whites avoiding Jackson State because of
perceived inferiority and racial identity) [hereinafter LDF Brief].
192Whites can hardly be blamed for wanting to attend better funded institutions who
wouldn't? The state continues to fetter choice by spending funds on the HWUs and
allowing the HBUs to rot. For example, Mississippi Valley State University and Delta
State University are only 35 miles apart. Yet in terms of resources, they are more like 3.5
million miles apart. At Mississippi Valley, "classrooms go unpainted, roofs leak, steps
crumble, the sewage system stops up, one dorm is boarded up, and buildings are mostly
stark cinderblock with none of the manicured shrubbery that sprawls across
predominantly white Mississippi State, Ole Miss or University of Southem Mississippi
campuses." Black Universities; Delta Blues, THE EcONOMIST, Dec. 12,1992, at30. Moreover,
Mississippi's predominantly white campuses have legions of graduate courses and
research labs: Mississippi Valley has just one master's course and no doctoral programs.
Id. Since the State controls the funding of its institutions (in 1992 the State spent over
$200 million on the HWUs and only $25.5 million on the HBUs, id.), allowing Mississippi
Valley to exist in such a dilapidated condition, while continuing to spend only on the
HWUs clearly fetters choice.
193 See Ayers II, 893 F.2d at 735 n. 12.
1941d. at 752.
195Gewirtz, supra note 173, at 744.
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included racial slurs and denigrating blacks as a people, discrimination in the
availability of a variety of services and programs, unfair grading practices and
inaction by the campus police and by the chancellor regarding safety issues. 196
Along with actual physical duress, black students who do choose to attend
predominantly white colleges are faced with overcoming the distorted
attitudes that society and the state have perpetuated about them. Moreover, by
absolving itself from having influenced choice, the state permits the individual
who elects to cross the color line to become the target of hostility.197 Professor
Brown says, "the combined power of white choice and state neutrality to
perpetuate segregation is further exacerbated when the state does little to
assuage the burden this places on black students as they attempt to... advance
their constitutionally guaranteed right to educational opportunity. Therefore,
many blacks consciously avoid predominantly white schools to avoid the
academically and socially adverse consequences of racial bias and
harassment."198
It appears that the State plays a major role in fettering the school choices of
both black and white students. This fettering results in continued segregation
as black students "choose" HBUs and white students "choose" HWUs. Insofar
as desegregation is the goal, state fettering of student choice precludes its
achievement. Consequently, to argue for maintenance of the status quo, as does
Mary Ann Connell, is misguided, and the State ought to try other approaches.
Professor Robert Davis, in his article, The Quest for Equal Education in
Mississippi,199 offers a radically different approach. He professes the desire to
create a solution that will "comply with constitutional requirements and
provide a quality education for all of [Mississippi's] citizens, black and
white."200 To this end he presents a total of fourteen recommendations to
196See Motion of Former Black Students of the University of Mississippi for Leave to
File Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners and Brief, at 8-12, Fordice (No.
90-65888) [hereinafter Motion of Former University of Mississippi Black Students].
197Samuel Meyers, President of the National Association for Equal Opportunity in
Higher Education (members are presidents of predominantly black colleges), remarked
that "mounting racial tensions at white colleges may prompt black students to enroll at
black colleges." Alex Poinsett, What Blacks Can Expect in the 90s, EBONY, Jan. 1990, at 54,
58; see also Isabel Wilkerson, Racial Harassment Altering Blacks' Choice in College, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 1990, at Al; U.S. COMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BIGOTRY AND VIOLENCE ON
AMERICAN COLLEGE CAMPUSES (1990).
198Brown, supra note 178, at 100.
199Davis, supra note 11. The Mississippi Board of Trustees [hereinafter MBOT] offered
their own proposal. Ronald Smothers, Desegregation Plan Offered in Mississippi, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 23, 1992, at 16. In it, they advocate the enhancement of Jackson State to
comprehensive status, closing Mississippi Valley and merging Alcom State into
Mississippi State University. Id. The MBOT proposal appeared in October, 1992 while
Davis' article appeared in winter, 1993. As a result, Davis incorporates the MBOT
proposal into his own and therefore, I discuss them together.
200 Davis, supra note 11, at 452.
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"provide for quality education in Mississippi for all."201 His recommendations
are as follows: 202 First, Mississippi needs to make education its number one
funding priority. Without proper funding no amount of reform can be
effective. 203 Second, the State should eliminate five of its eight universities
through mergers, consolidations and closures. 204 Third, the State should
finance three comprehensive universities which are geographically divided by
north, south and central.205 Instead of being racially identifiable, these
institutions would pull all students from the represented regions.
20 6
Fourth, the State should establish a commission to determine which schools
should be closed. In Professor Davis' view, two of three HBUs are "prime
candidates for merger, consolidation or closure based on facilities, student
population, and budgets."20 7 Jackson State University, the only other black
school, survives the axe solely because it is in the capital of the state. It should
be enhanced to make the school attractive to white students. Fifth, after
acknowledging that the HBUs play a critical role in educating black students,
Professor Davis goes on to say that a degree from an HBU is a handicap in the
job market and is therefore of little value.208 However, if the HBUs want to
continue to operate, they should do so without public funds. Sixth, Mississippi
University for Women should be taken off the tax roles for the same reason.209
Seventh, the Governor, the State Board of Institutions of Higher Learning
and the parties should restructure the graduate and professional degree
programs to eliminate unnecessary duplication in course offerings.210 Eighth,
the Governor should establish a State Education Committee comprised of a
cross-section of Mississippians to monitor the following areas at the system's
three institutions: racial composition of the student body; racial composition
of the faculty and administration; changes in admissions policies; changes in
201Id. at 489.
202Id. at 493-99.
203Id. at 493.
204 d. at 494.
205 Davis, supra note 11, at 494.
206 The MBOT advocates maintenance of four comprehensive universities. They keep
all three HWU comprehensives and would add an upgraded Jackson State to make four
comprehensives. Professor Davis would upgradeJackson State because it is in the state's
capital. Id. So, he would close one of the current HWU comprehensives.
2 07Davis, supra note 11, at 495.
208Id. at 496.
20 9Under the MBOT proposal, Mississippi University for Women would be merged
into University of Southern Mississippi.
21ODavis, supra note 11, at 497.
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tenure requirements; new facilities construction; new appointments to the State
College Board; and any changes in program development.211
Ninth, the university system should adopt a preparatory skills program at
each regional school to prepare students for college or enhance the junior
college system with a possibility of transfer to a regional school.212 In
conjunction, recommendation ten urges the adoption of flexible admissions
requirements that reflect a combination of ACT, GPA, work and life
experiences.213 Those who do not meet the admissions requirements will be
allowed to enroll at a junior college with the possibility of transfer to a regional
school.214
Eleventh, try to utilize closed facilities or if not, sell them to raise money for
the rest of the system. 215 Twelfth, to the extent possible try to incorporate the
best teachers and administrators from any institution that is merged or closed.
Those displaced can possibly be accommodated by providing them with
alternative employment within the system or placement assistance outside the
state.216 Thirteenth, the State legislature should redirect all revenue expended
on the closed five institutions to the university system and since merger,
consolidation or closure may be more expensive then the current system, the
needed funds ought to be raised.217 Finally, the university system should
develop incentives that will attract and keep a top quality faculty at its
institutions.2 18
I agree with some of Professor Davis' proposals. For instance, it is critical for
the State to make education its number one funding priority.219 I also agree that
some schools need to be closed, that there should be a multi-racial Board of
Governors created to guide the Mississippi university system, that preparatory
skills classes need to be offered, available space should be either utilized or
sold, and that the system should try to attract top quality faculty. However, I
also have some serious difficulties with his other recommendations.
Although I believe some schools should be closed, I think it should be the
HWUs not the HBUs. As I articulated in the Introduction, the HBUs serve the
vital function of correcting for past discrimination in education in that they are
2111d.
212Id.
213 The MBOT proposal advocates using a mix of ACT and grade point averages.
2 14 Davis, supra note 11, at 497-98.
2151d.
2 16 1d. at 498.
217Id.
218Id. at 498-99.
219 Mississippi's state legislature apparently disagrees because it has reduced
educational spending for the '93-'94 school year by $7.4 million. Black Universities; Delta
Blues, supra note 192, at 30.
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accessible because of their admissions requirements, remedial programs and
affordability. In Adams v. Richardson,220 the National Association for Equal
Educational Opportunity in Higher Education [hereinafter NAFEO] filed an
amicus curiae brief in which they argued that black people should not be forced
to give up the tangible educational opportunities at black colleges for the
intangible and yet to be realized advantages of a unitary system:
The black institutions of higher education have served and continue
to serve as the bridge between a crippling and debilitating elementary
and secondary educational system to which Brown itself was directed
because of the experience with the equal education cases from Murray
to Sweatt in the field of higher education. This experience
demonstrated that equality of educational attainment could not be
achieved until the feeder system of the secondary and elementary
levels had been improved for black students. Eighteen years after
Brown, with a general consensus that this feeder system has not been
improved-and maybe has lost ground,... the assimilation of the
black institutions of higher learning would be to remove the wooden
beam in order to replace it with a steel or cement support before the
new beam is in place, leaving the structure unsupported at all.
221
Professor Gil Kujovich expands on this theme by exploring the affirmative
action service HBUs provide.222 He says, "[D]isestablishment addresses one
effect or vestige of the separate but equal era-racial duality in public colleges.
In its concern with the structural vestige of segregation, however, the remedy
affords little relief for the far-reaching effects past discrimination had on the
black population .... [Green's command for 'just schools'] threatens to deny
black colleges their continuing role in affording higher education to blacks
while Bakke limits the ability of other institutions to assume that function."223
Echoing Professor Kujovich, Kenneth S. Tollet states that "Black higher
educational institutions are quintessentially affirmative action organizations
which assist the United States in reversing the effects of societal discrimination
against Blacks."224 Tollet argues that in order to serve their affirmative action
function, HBUs need to be exclusively black.225 I do not go that far. But, I do
feel that Professor Davis' proposals ignore the affirmative action function
220480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
22 1Brief of the National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education at 19,
Adams v. Richardson, reprinted in LEONARD L. HAYNES, A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
ADAMS CASE: A SOURCE BOOK, at C-21 [hereinafter NAFEO Brief].
22 2Kujovich, supra note 12, at 152.
22 31d. at 169-70.
22 4TOLLET, supra note 12, at 4.
22 5 d. at 40.
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served by the HBUs. 226 Professor Davis tries to address the past discrimination
argument by proposing the implementation of remedial programs and flexible
admissions criteria at the three regional schools.
While this is an attractive solution, it is not adequate because it may reduce
the overall educational opportunities for black students. Professor Davis'
flexible admissions requirements include the use of test scores, GPA and life
experience. These admissions criteria are not particularly "flexible" compared
to most HBUs where the admission criteria usually results in automatic
admission for all who apply.22 7 Professor Davis says that if students are not
admitted they can go to a junior college and possibly transfer.228 I think most
would agree that the environment provided by the HBUs as documented by
the NAFEO brief, Toilet and Professor Kujovich is preferable to a junior college.
Another problem with Professor Davis' proposal is that it would seem that
those who need the remedial programs are being turned away and sent to
junior colleges. Whereas the HBUs admit most people and provide the
remedial courses because they know that these students have no where else to
go.
Professor Davis' proposals also ignore the role black faculty and
administrators play in the education of black students. Although the United
States Supreme Court has rejected the role model theory as constitutionally
required or protected,229 many have commented that it is sound educational
policy.230 The most Professor Davis can promise is that after the best faculty
and administrators are skimmed off, the rest will be given relocation assistance.
There are several problems with this recommendation. First, since most faculty
and administrators at HBUs do not possess the terminal degree and are still de
facto segregated from their white colleagues in academic circles, very few will
find jobs in the three regional universities.23 1 Second, most black college and
22 6 Mississippi Valley has produced 11,000 graduates the past four decades, many of
whom might never have attended college elsewhere. The college operates a remedial
learning center for freshmen who need tutoring. Without it many could never meet more
stringent entrance requirements elsewhere. Tom Watson, Black Colleges, USA TODAY,
Jan. 28, 1993, at 1.
22 7See, e.g., Kujovich, supra note 12, at 90.
228 Davis, supra note 11, at 498.
229See, e.g., discussion of Bakke, infra note 342.
230 See, e.g., PREER, supra note 12; TOLLET, supra note 12; Kujovich, supra note 12; Spencer
H. Holland, A Radical Approach to Educating Young Black Males, EDuC. WEEK, Mar. 25,
1987; Edgar G. Epps, Academic Culture and the Minority Professor, ACADEME, Sept.-Oct.
1989; Pamela J. Smith, All-Male Black Schools and the Equal Protection Clause: A Step
Forward Toward Education, 66 TuL. L. REV. 2003 (1992).
231Edgar Epps argues, 'In hiring new faculty, selection committees-typically
composed primarily of white males--generally rank candidates largely on the basis of
the prestige of the institutions from which they obtained their principal degrees." Id.; see
also, National Research Council, Rise in Number of Black Ph.D.'s Is Reported, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 5, 1992 (twelve HBUs responsible for 40% of Black college and graduate school
graduates). Thus, if selection committees are looking for candidates from only the
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graduate school graduates who teach, teach at HBUs.232 Consequently,
elimination of the HBUs reduces the number of employed black faculty and
thereby reducing role models for black students. As Professor Kujovich says,
"if the demise of separate but equal meant the demise of black public colleges,
one of the two major employers of black academics would be eliminated."233
Finally, the suggestion that the State provide relocation assistance is similar to
the out-of-state scholarships provided black graduate students which were
thoroughly discredited in Pearson v. Murray234 and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada.235
Professor Davis' recommendations are also insulting and allow the state to
capitalize on its own prior discrimination. In his fourth and fifth
recommendations he asserts that degree holders from black colleges are
"crippled" in the job market because no one respects their degrees.236 The built
in assumption, of course, is that if granted degrees from one of the three
regional (white) schools, black job seekers would have an easier time.237 Even
if this proposition were true, it ignores the racism perpetrated by the State
which has resulted in the inferior resources of the HBUs which adds to their
stigma and thereby makes it difficult for its graduates to attain jobs.238
Professor Davis also asserts that the HBUs are "prime candidates" for closure
because they are so poor in resources compared to their HWU neighbors.239 J.
Clay Smith, a Professor of Law at Howard University who filed a brief in the
Fordice case on behalf of NAFEO, asserted that the decision to close historically
black schools in Mississippi and elsewhere has been driven by "a devaluation
mentality.., the schools received inadequate funding because they were black.
Then they have been targeted for closure because they are inadequate from lack
of funding."240 Again, I contend that some of the HWUs are "prime candidates"
for closure because of the important function that the HBUs serve.
prestigious schools and public HBUs because of their historical deprivation, are not
considered prestigious, then those faculty have very little chance of being hired in the
HWUs.
232 Id.
233Kujovich, supra note 12, at 95.
234182 A. 590 (Md. 1936).
235305 U.S. 337 (1938).
236 Davis, supra note 11, at 491.
23 71n fact, Professor Davis gives no evidence to support this assertion.
238 See, e.g., PREER, supra note 12; Kujovich, supra note 12, for a detailed history of the
financial, educational and other resource discrimination and degradation forced upon
the HBUs before and after Brown I and II.
239Davis, supra note 11, at 491.
24 OPeter Schmidt, Desegregation Ruling Seen Spurring Calls To Close Black Colleges, EDUC.
WEEK, Feb. 3, 1993, at 1.
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Finally, Professor Davis' proposals completely ignore financing a college
education. One of the most attractive features of HBUs is that they are
affordable. They price themselves for their constituency. How would financial
aid work at these three new colleges? The American Council on Education
stated that "access by minorities to higher education is in peril because of the
imbalance between federal loans and grants, the impending cut in the
maximum Pell Grant award and tight state fiscal conditions. 241 So, by
eliminating the HBUs, Professor Davis' proposal effectively reduces
educational opportunities for those black students who cannot afford to attend
one of the three new schools.
Professor Davis offered his recommendations as a way to increase
educational opportunities for all of Mississippi's students. Yet, his
recommendations will have the effect of reducing, rather than increasing,
educational opportunities for black students. They also have the added burden
of reducing employment opportunities for black faculty and thereby reducing
role models for the black students in the State.
Kenyon D. Bunch and Grant B. Mindle present an argument that merges the
thinking of Connell and Professor Davis. They argue two points.242 First, like
Connell, the authors contend that Green is not the appropriate standard for
higher education. For if it were, States would be forced to eliminate their HBUs
via mergers with the HWUs. Second, like Professor Davis, they argue that the
HWUs would be the surviving institutions because they are better and white
students would not attend HBUs. 243
Not surprisingly, their whole argument turns on the continued existence of
the HBUs and the problems their continued existence presents. They make it
clear that if the HBUs were merged or closed, desegregation would be
accomplished. Lamenting the fact that the Office of Civil Rights [hereinafter
OCR] of the Department of Education (formerly in the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare) required specific desegregation goals for HW-Us only,
the authors state that "desegregation of HWUs is to be accomplished primarily
by increasing the enrollment rate of black high school graduates rather than by
significantly reducing black enrollment at HBUs."244
Later in the article they assert that "by insulating HBUs from the burden of
desegregation, the courts have deprived them of any incentive to recruit white
students, faculty and staff. Moreover, the absence of significant numbers of
24 1Mark Walsh, Budget Cuts Seen Imperiling Minority Enrollment Gains, EDUC. WEEK,
Jan. 20, 1993, at 1.
24 2Bunch & Mindle, supra note 11.
243 1d. at 543; see also Davis, supra note 11, where he argues that the HBUs are "prime
candidates" for merger or closure because they are so inferior to the HW-Us. Cf. Schmidt,
supra note 240, where J. Clay Smith argues that this position allows the State to profit
from its own racism because it purposely underfunded the HBUs and now wants to
close them for lack of funding.
24 4Bunch & Mindle, supra note 11, at 543.
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white students can always be cited to justify their request for additional
institutional resources on the grounds that still more resources are necessary
to bolster their academic reputation within the white community." 245 Finally,
the authors conclude that "if courts were serious about desegregating
HBUs-and they are not-there would have been more mergers of
geographically proximate institutions.' 246
The authors criticize the proportionality requirement because it provides no
incentive to help the "second and third tier black students, students who are
unlikely to enroll, let alone succeed, in higher education without additional
assistance."247 Instead, the system provides incentives to engage in a "bidding
war for talented black students and faculty ... ."248 It appears that the authors
are concerned about two things: 1) that the second and third tier students are
ignored and 2) the present system only provides educational opportunities for
a selected few. Yet, by attacking the HBUs, the authors exacerbate the very
problem they are writing to correct.
The HBUs typically attract the so-called "second and third tier students".
Since these students are ignored by the HWUs, without the existence of the
HBUs, they would have no college to attend. Also, without the HBUs, only
those black students who could meet the admissions requirement of the HWUs
and who could afford the HWUs tuition would attend those schools. Thus, the
authors would merely replace one system for another, but with the same effects
of ignoring the lower tier students and providing educational opportunities to
a select few.
The authors make this mistake because they equate equal access to the
HWUs with equal opportunity to an education. This equation was first
established in Brown I. In oral argument,249 Thurgood Marshall relied on the
graduate school cases to argue that separation was inherently unequal.250 Yet,
2 451d. at 572.
2461d. at 573.
2471d. at 570.
2481d.
249 Reprinted in LEON FRIEDMAN, ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARDOF EDUCATIONOF TOPEKA 1952-1955 (1969).
250Id. at 201. The graduate school cases leading to Brown I involved the following: in
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), the Supreme Court held that
Missouri's out-of-state tuition grants for black students were not equivalent of in-state
instruction for white students and did not satisfy the constitutional requirement of equal
protection;in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), the Court relied exclusively
on the Gaines decision and required that the State of Oklahoma provide Sipuel with a
law school education in conformitywith the equalprotection clause; in Sweattv. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950), the Court held the law school provided Sweatt was not substantially
equivalent to the law school of the University of Texas in terms of tangible factors such
as facilities and faculty and intangible factors such as reputation and alumni support;
in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), the Court held that once
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the graduate school cases had all involved segregation in fact. The records of
each one of those cases were filled with minute factual comparisons between
the black and white schools. Now, however, Marshall was trying to use these
cases to assert a new principal that separate was not just unequal in fact, but
that it was inherently unequal.251
Justice Frankfurter seized on the apparent inconsistency: "Am I wrong in
thinking that you must reject the basis of the decision in McLaurin for purposes
of this case?" 252 The question was designed to smoke out whether Marshall
was trying to argue that racial classifications in education were inherently
invalid or whether the factual comparisons in each case were relevant. Justice
Frankfurter continued:
The basis [of McLaurin] was whether each got the same thing. Your
position in these cases is that is not arguable, that you cannot
differentiate, you cannot enter the domain of whether a black child or
a white child gets the same educational advantages or facilities or
opportunity. You must reject that, do you not?
53
Marshall finally gave up on the Delaware case which, like the other higher
education cases, was grounded in a minute comparison of educational
offerings. Marshall agreed with Justice Frankfurter that for purposes of this
case, comparisons between white and black schools was irrelevant for two
reasons, "one, it is not in this case because we agreed that equality is outside
the case, and [two,] our argument is deliberately broad enough to encompass
a situation regardless of facilities, and we make no issue about it."254
Justice Frankfurter responded, "I understand that, but what will be a ground
on which the series of cases in the McLaurin case-the point of my question is
that I think we are dealing with two different legal propositions: McLaurin is
one and what you are tendering the Court is another."255 Of course, Justice
Frankfurter was right. Marshall and the NAACP had argued the separate but
equal doctrine previously and now were arguing separate as inherently
unequal.
Although the Court adopted the standard offered by the NAACP, that
standard is questionable today.256 The primary concern is that by saying
separate is inherently unequal, that implies that the corollary is true: that not
admitted to a white school, the state could not segregate within the school or otherwise
treat that student differently based solely on race.
25 1FRIEDMAN, supra note 249, at 199.
2521d. at 202.
2531d.
2541d. at 203.
255 Id.
25 6See, e.g., PREER, supra note 12; Kujovich, supra note 12; Roberta Steele, All Things Not
Being Equal: The Case for Race Separate Schools, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 591 (1993).
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separate or integration is inherently equal. In other words, once the barriers to
education have been removed, the black students will attend the white schools
because they are better and better facilities equal a better education. Therefore,
integration, equal access, provides equal opportunity to education.
Yet as I demonstrated in critiquing Professor Davis' proposals and now in
critiquing Bunch and Mindle, equal access to the white schools is good insofar
as they have the best resources and better resources usually do equal a better
education. While, this argument works at the grade school level, it is more
difficult to apply at the graduate school level. As Jean Preer has written, "the
subsequent failure of the Court to consider the question of difference of schools
between the elementary and secondary level and the college level hampered
both the immediate and long-range application of the Brown decision to higher
education."257
The difficulty lies in the fact that separate is not inherently unequal at the
higher education level. Rather, as the McLaurin line of cases demonstrated,
separate was unequal in fact, in terms of access to resources and the State is
directly and purposefully responsible for that predicament. 258 Moreover,
according to Drew S. Days, today, many black people are questioning the
integrative ideal.259 He says,
Several developments in recent years suggest that growing numbers
of blacks are turning away from the integrative ideal. Four examples
of this shift are worth noting: first, black parents now express support
for school board efforts to end desegregation plans that involve busing,
favoring instead a return to neighborhood schools, even though the
result would be all-black schools in the inner-city; second, at the urging
of black parents, school boards in a number of major cities have
attempted to create all-black male academies; third, black students,
faculty, administrators and alumni have joined with southern state
officials to resist desegregation plans of historically black colleges; and
fourth, black students on predominantly white college campuses have
urged administrators to provide special facilities for black students'
social and cultural events.
260
Furthermore, with only 16 percent of the black college population, HBU's
continue to graduate 40 percent of black degree holders. 261 Enrollment at HBUs
257pREER, supra note 12, at 134.
258 See, e.g., Kujovich, supra note 12.
259 Days, supra note 14, at 54.
260Id.
2 6 1 BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, REPORT ON BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
(1992).
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increased 3.1 percent in 1992.262 These examples demonstrate that HBUs
continue to serve the following: those who cannot meet the admissions
standards of the HWUs; those who meet the admissions standards but cannot
afford to attend; those who meet the admissions requirements, can afford to
attend, but who do not end up graduating from the HWUs;2 63 and those who
for reasons of safety and psychological comfort deliberately chose HBUs. 264 I
do not dispute that opening the doors of the HWUs to black students increases
educational opportunity. It obviously does insofar as opening those doors
provides black students with more educational options. My point is that the
process of opening those doors should not include the elimination of the HBUs,
as Professor Davis, Bunch and Mindle propose. The HBUs continue to provide
education to those who otherwise cannot attend or will not graduate from an
HWU. So, any process that has as its goal the increase of educational
opportunity for black students, but also requires the elimination of the HBUs,
actually will create a net loss in educational opportunities for black students.
Professor Kujovich says, "[F]or many black undergraduates the black public
colleges provided opportunities that would not be available in a racially
unitary system offering only 'equal treatment.""265
IV. PART III: LDF DESEGREGATION LITIGATION
Professor Kujovich's observation represents one of the three traditional
responses in the black community to the issue of desegregation in higher
education. Professor Kujovich's position that the HBUs must continue to exist
and be enhanced because a unitary system would actually underserve the black
community is the most popular.266 Other responses include the notion that
HBUs as instruments of affirmative action may take race into account in
admission and hiring decisions (i.e., remain defacto predominantly/exclusively
black).267 Finally, in stark contrast, there is the response, largely articulated by
the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. [hereinafter LDF], until
2621d. at 2. Moreover, HBUs "are widely held to teach blacks what white colleges
cannot: self-esteem and leadership. Enrollment in them has gone up by 15% since 1986."
Black Universities; Delta Blues, supra note 192, at 30.
2 63If HBUs only have 16 percent of the black college population yet continue to
graduate 40 percent of all black degree holders, then many black students who attend
HWUs are not graduating from the HWUs. Of those, the statistics suggest that some
must continue their education atHBUs.
2 64See, e.g., Motion of Former University of Mississippi Black Students, supra note 196,
at 8-12.
2 65Kujovich, supra note 12, at 160.
2 66 Id.; see also, infra notes 299-301, 308 and supra note 236.
26 7See, e.g., TOLLET, supra note 12.
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rather recently, that the HBUs should be abolished in favor of establishing a
unitary system of education.268
The story of LDF's litigation strategies to desegregate higher education is a
fascinating one precisely because, over time, it has evoked all three of these
responses. The LDF litigation in this area has occurred in three time periods:
pre-Brown cases,269 Brown to Adams cases, 270 and finally, the Adams case. In the
pre-Brown cases, LDF sought to overcome restricted access to education by
demonstrating the inferiority of the HBUs. This conservative legal approach
sought to guard against the potential harm of judicial reaffirmation of the Plessy
doctrine if the Supreme Court rejected an outright attack on segregation. In
theory, claims for equal access to education could be made apart from the
quality of educational offerings on either side of the color line; claims for equal
opportunity to an education required ignoring or disputing the Positive
educational role of the HBUs. Even after LDF switched to a frontal assault on
segregation itself, it offered arguments based on the inferiority of the HBUs.
This attack on segregation generated serious divisiveness in the black
community. W.E.B. DuBois objected to attacks on segregation that took HBUs
and black teachers as their targets. For DuBois, only the HBUs could train the
race's 'Talented Tenth', those "standing conspicuously among the best of their
time," to undertake the highest intellectual pursuits and to emerge "as leaders
of thought and missionaries of culture among their people."271 DuBois was not
in favor of segregation. Just the opposite, he was strongly opposed to it. Yet, he
felt that, in order to make progress, black people would need to "internally
self-organize for self-respect and self-defense." 272 Thus, DuBois saw the
problem as two-fold: to "pound at the closed gates of opportunity and
denounce caste and segregation" but also to insure that the separate black
school "is the best possible school; that it is decently housed and effectively
taught by well-trained teachers."273 DuBois urged that blacks demand control
of the finances and curriculum of the separate school. He distinguished
between segregation and separation. He viewed segregation that was legally
imposed as an evil hindrance to black advancement, but separation that was
voluntary as a potential benefit to the race.274
2685ee NAACP position in Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D. D.C.), modified,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
269 5ee infra note 312.
27 ODiscussion of Green, supra note 42; discussion of ASTA, supra note 44; discussion
of Sanders, supra note 54; discussion of Norris, supra note 184.
27 1W.E.B. DuBois, The Talented Tenth, THE NEGRO PROBLEM: A SERIES OF ARTICLES BY
REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN NEGROES OF TODAY 75 (1903).
2 72 DuBois, Separation and Self-Respect, supra note 16, at 85.
2 731d.
274 W.E.B. DuBois, History of Segregation Philosophy, in THE CRISIS 85 (1934).
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The NAACP leadership stood on the other side of this debate. For DuBois,
the HBUs were a continuing source of educational opportunity for black
students, while for the NAACP leadership, the HBUs were a continuing symbol
of legally imposed racial separation.
Despite the on-going debate, the NAACP pursued their integration strategy
which culminated in the Brown decision. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court,
in Brown held that the separate, but equal doctrine had no place in public
education, not because racial classifications are constitutionally invalid, but
because separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. This approach
emphasized the undeniable weaknesses of separate black schools at the
expense of their past significance and future role. Despite the elimination of
legal barriers, enrollment patterns at HBUs and HWUs stayed segregated
mostly due to the violent resistance of whites to integration,275 but also due to
academic, economic and cultural factors.
As a result of this post-Brown resistance to school desegregation, the LDF
litigated Green, ASTA, Sanders and Norris. In each case, they pursued the "just
schools" rationale articulated by Justice Brennan in Green.276 The Supreme
Court in Green adopted the "just schools" approach for elementary/secondary
education and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the "just schools"
approach for higher education in the Norris case. However, in ASTA the Fifth
Circuit rejected this approach for higher education as did the Sixth Circuit in
Sanders.
The struggle over desegregation of higher education in the courts mirrored
the struggle occurring in the black community over the "just schools" approach.
The NAACP relied heavily on a report issued by sociologist James Coleman
entitled Equality of Educational Opportunity,277 in their litigation during this time
period. The report focused exclusively on the short-comings of the HBUs
concluding "that faculties in these colleges receive lower pay, that laboratories
are less well-equipped, that fewer faculty members hold the earned doctorate,
that teaching loads are heavier, and that library holdings may be meager."2 78
In relying on this report, LDF ignored the report's reminder that there exists
"huge gaps in our knowledge about the complex sorting process by which
students do or do not attempt higher education, and arrive on one campus or
another."279 The study examined both tangible and intangible aspects of
schooling and concluded that the performance of black students improved in
schools and classrooms with a significant proportion of whites. Since this
275See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 341 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962).
276391 U.S. 430 (1968); see supra note 38.
2 7 7 JAMES COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).
2 781d. at 368.
279Id.
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conclusion vindicated the "just schools" approach of the LDF, its lawyers, such
as Robert Carter, incorporated these findings in new desegregation suits.
Yet, by the end of the 1960's, the LDF was under heavy attack for use of such
findings and even James Coleman himself later questioned the validity of his
conclusions.280 Black educators were keenly aware that their schools suffered
from lack of funds and power. This was related to their schools' racial identity
but was not necessarily synonymous with it. As such, black colleges began to
organize themselves. In 1968, they established the Office for Advancement of
Public Negro Colleges to increase the visibility of those colleges and to attract
financial support from the private sector.281 A year later, the presidents of both
public and private black colleges formed the National Association for Equal
Opportunity in Higher Education to challenge the Nixon administration's lack
of support for black higher education.282 This group appeared at the
congressional hearings on amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965.
There, the group advocated for the continued existence of the HBUs on the
basis that the schools provide access to education to students who would
otherwise not have access to college.283
Vivian W. Henderson, President of Clark College in Atlanta, summarized the
feelings of NAFEO members when she said,
I am not a black nationalist or black power advocate, but I do raise
questions as to whether a college has to be white to be good and to be
good enough for everybody. I raise a fundamental question at this
point. What is wrong with Negro colleges continuing to be Negro
Colleges? They are going to be just that for a long time to come and
perhaps it wouldn't be a bad idea for them to remain Negro colleges
through eternity. A second fundamental question to be faced in higher
education is this: What is wrong with whites going to Negro
colleges?
284
LDF responded to both of President Henderson's -questions by filing a
lawsuit against OCR in 1970.285 Like ASTA, Sanders and Norris, plaintiffs did
not allege specific discriminatory policies or acts. Unlike its predecessors,
2 80James Coleman, Beneficial Desegregation v. Destructive Desegregation, WASH. POST,
Dec. 8,1978, at A19.
2 8 1SoUTHERN EDUCATION FOUNDATION, SMALL CHANGE: A REPORT ON FEDERAL
SUPPORT FOR BLACK COLLEGES 7 (1972).
2 821d. at 16-17; Miles M. Fisher IV, National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher
Education: Crusader for the Black College, 3 CIVIL RIGHTS DIGEST 18 (1970).
283Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Education, 91st Cong., 1st sess., at 440
(1970).
284 Vivian W. Henderson, The Role of the Predominantly Negro Institutions, 36 J. NEGRO
EDUC 270, 271 (1967).
28 5Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D. D.C.), modified, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
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however, it did not concern a particular state system or even the scope of the
affirmative duty to desegregate. Rather, it charged the federal government with
"general and calculated default" and cited a 1970 report of the Commission on
Civil Rights that there had been a "major breakdown" in the enforcement of
civil rights laws. Plaintiffs called for an injunction requiring OCR to exert
stronger efforts in enforcing the laws.286 The goal of the litigation was to
increase desegregation in higher education (i.e., increasing the rate at which
black students attended white colleges).
At trial, LDF used the same strategy from the pre-Brown cases and
questioned witnesses on every minute aspect of comparison between white
and black colleges. The purpose of the questions was to demonstrate the
inferiority of the HBUs and thereby the need to expedite desegregation, so that
black students would no longer need to waste time attending the HBUs.287 The
trial court focused on whether or not OCR was enforcing desegregation laws
and found that ithad not. The court, therefore, ruled for the plaintiffs. Although
LDF prevailed at trial, it was not clear what they had won. While enforcement
of the desegregation laws is obviously a good thing, LDF did not consider what
effect this enforcement might have on the continued existence of the HBUs, nor
did they consider what would happen to the students, faculty and staff at the
HBUs were they no longer in existence. LDF ignored these concerns because
they did not consult with any educators when formulating their litigation
strategy.
As a result of being ignored at trial, NAFEO filed an amicus curiae brief on
appeal. 288 The filing of this brief marked the first time that black educators
openly and formally opposed LDF in court and signaled a significant break
with the past.289 On the equal access to education side of the equation, NAFEO
challenged three of LDF's basic premises: whether public school precedents
provided suitable standards for higher education; whether black colleges could
be implicated in systemwide discrimination; and whether eliminating the
racial identity of state colleges realistically promised to enhance educational
opportunities for black youth.290 NAFEO argued that black colleges were not
the perpetrators of segregation, but its victims, and could not be sacrificed in
an effort to achieve integration.291
On the educational opportunity side of the equation, NAFEO argued that
black colleges had the most experience and expertise in dealing with the
educational needs of black students.292 While LDF equated educational
286Id. at 93.
287pREER, supra note 12, at 201.
28 8NAFEO Brief, supra note 221, at 19.
289pREER, supra note 12, at 3.
29 0NAFEO Brief, supra note 221, at 16.
2 9 1ad.
292/d. at 17.
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opportunity with shifts in enrollment patterns and the elimination of racial
identity, the black college presidents went beyond statistics to the substance of
the educational process. They objected to the contention that black colleges
were responsible for maintaining educational duality and should therefore be
"assimilated into the white unitary system where there is presumptively, equal
educational opportunity, independent of, and maybe contrary to, the State's
wishes to establish and maintain a 'special purpose' Institution of Higher
Education."293 In essence, NAFEO argued that black people should not be
forced to give up the tangible educational opportunities at black colleges for
the intangible and yet to be realized advantages of a unitary system.
The appellate court upheld the district court order finding that OCR had not
fulfilled its obligations to enforce Title VI.294 The court agreed with LDF that
the goal should be a unitary system of higher education, but it also agreed with
NAFEO when it said, "a predicate for minority access to quality post-graduate
programs is a viable, co-ordinated state-wide higher education policy that
takes into account the special problems of minority students and of Black
colleges."295 This ruling was a mixed victory for both sides. The court wanted
OCR to force states to create a unitary system, but not at the expense of the
HBUs.296
The future of black colleges was widely debated outside the courtroom. In
1972 Dr. James Cheek, President of Howard University, criticized the
assumption made by many white and black Americans that quality education
could only occur through integration that involved the destruction or closing
of black colleges and the enrollment of black students at predominantly white
colleges.297 The first National Black Political Convention, meeting in Gary,
Indiana, in March of 1972, took a stand against the merger of black and white
colleges in the South,298 and in 1973 Operation PUSH, headed by the Reverend
2 931d. at 19.
294Adams, 480 F.2d at 1164.
295/d.
296The D.C. Circuit's ruling in Adams is similar to the rulings of many courts in the
affirmative action context. Courts have struggled with the desire for a "color-blind"
society (i.e., a unitary system), on the hand, but not at the expense of rectifying past
discrimination on the other. They typically settle on mandating color-blindness except
where an affirmative action scheme is designed to remedy documented/specific past
discrimination as opposed to general past societal discrimination. See, e.g., City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469 (1989); University of Regents v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267(1986); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc.
v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
297Thomas A. Johnson, N.E.T. Panel of Black Leaders Cites Need for Quality Education,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1972, at 87.
298Thomas A. Johnson, Black Assembly Voted at Parley, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 13,1972, at 30.
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Jesse Jackson, sponsored Black Expo, with the theme "Save the Black
Colleges."299
The debate raged within the NAACP itself. At the Association's 1973 annual
meeting the national leadership introduced a resolution calling for mergers to
achieve desegregation. After spirited debate, the title of the resolution was
changed from "Merger of State Supported Colleges" to "Desegregation of State
Supported Systems." The NAACP lacked a firm definition of desegregation in
higher education. After he agreed to the revised rewording, Roy Wilkins
remarked, "There is nothing at variance in association policy in calling for
desegregation of state supported systems. Under desegregation, any kind of
operation that would desegregate those facilities would be acceptable."300
While recognizing the hostility of many blacks to further desegregation, the
NAACP, in 1974, backed a Louisiana plan that would merge black Southern
University with white Louisiana State University and black Grambling College
with white Louisiana Tech University with the white institutions as the
surviving institutions.301
In The Crisis, educator Estelle Taylor wrote that many blacks were puzzled
by the ineffectiveness of the Brown decision and, in fact, believed that
integration had proved disastrous for a large segment of the black
population.30 2 Professor Derrick Bell concluded that, "As a legal principle, it
should now be clear that Brown can neither integrate our schools nor insure
that those minority children within such schools obtain an effective
education. 303 Like DuBois, he argued that either integrated or separate schools
could serve the educational interests of black children and that the power to
influence basic educational decisions was more important than racial
identity.304 Kenneth S. Tollet took Professor Bell's idea one step further and
argued that only separate schools properly educated black students and as such
HBUs operated as instruments of affirmative action. Accordingly, HBUs could
legally take race into account in admissions and hiring decisions.305
Dissatisfaction with LDF's position came not only from legal scholars and
educators, but also from plaintiffs. Disappointed with the way LDF was
handling the Adams litigation, a group of Mississippi residents sued the state
299pUSH, HUD Fail to Communicate, 4 RACE RELATIONS REPORTER 5 (1973).
300paul Delaney, N.A.A.C.P. Defeats Challenges to Its Principle ofIntegration, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7,1973, at 17.
301Paul Delaney, N.A.A.C.P. Opening New Orleans Parley, N.Y. TMEs, July 1, 1974, at
57.
3 02Estelle W. Taylor, Survival or Surrender: Dilemma in Higher Education, THE CRISIS,
Nov. 1975, at 335.
30 3Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Burden of Brown on Blacks: History-Based Observations on a
Landmark Decision, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 25, 26 (1975).
304 Bell, Waiting on the Promise of Brown, supra note 16.
305 TOLLET, supra note 12, at 54-67.
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on their own in 1975. This became the Ayers suit. As discussed above, the
plaintiffs took a completely different stance from the one articulated by LDF,
arguing that the elimination of racial identifiability was inimical to the interests
of black students, faculty and colleges in the state.306 They accused the United
States government, plaintiff-intervenor in Ayers and LDF of ignoring pervasive
and deep-seated evils of racism that "dismantling dual segregated system of
education" or "eliminating institutional racism" would leave untouched.307 The
plaintiffs argued that enhanced black access to formerly all-white colleges
should not replace but supplement the educational opportunities offered by
black institutions.3° 8
By the time Ayers grew into Fordice and reached the Supreme Court
seventeen years later, LDF had completely changed its position. In its anicus
curiae brief, LDF argues "there are many remedial measures that advance
disestablishment of a segregated and discriminatory regime and encourage
legitimate diversity among institutions and student choice." 309 The brief refers
to the desegregation criteria that the Adams court required OCR to adopt to
support its contention that uniformity in state systems of higher education is
not required,
Nothing in the [OCR] guidelines suggests or encourages a structure of
uniformity in state systems of higher education. In fact, the opposite
is encouraged as the Criteria urge the elimination of unnecessary
program duplication and the development of unique program
offerings at HBIs [Historically Black Institutions] to attract white
students.
3 10
To fully demonstrate their change in position, LDF goes so far as to argue
that it would be unconstitutional to close the HBUs. They state that "no discussion
of potential remedies can ignore the suggestions made throughout this
litigation that the appropriate remedy would be simply to close or neglect the
HBIs. Amici strongly urge the Court to reject that notion as offensive to the
Constitution."311 Incredibly, LDF supports this proposition by citing the Adams
case in which they argued that the HBUs should be closed in favor of a unitary
school system. They say, "in Adams v. Richardson [cite omitted], the en banc
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit unanimously recognized
306Ayers v. Waller, Civil Action No. GC 75-9-B (N.D. Miss. 1975).
307 BLACK MISSISSIPPIAN'S COUNCIL ON HIGHER EDUCATION, AYERS v. WALLER:
TOWARDS A SuBSTANTIvE DEFINITIONOF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 10-11 (1975).
308Id. at 17.
309LDF Brief, supra note 191, at 61.
310Id. at 62.
3 111d. at 62-63.
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the crucial role played by the HBIs in higher education and the need to 'take
into account the special problems of minority students and Black colleges."' 312
Finally, LDF closes their brief with the following admonition to the Court,
Fulfillment of Brown I's mandate of a 'racially nondiscriminatory
school system' requires that old forms of discrimination not be
replaced with new ones. A remedy that abandons or neglects the HBIs,
the only institutions that consistently show a commitment to
redressing the educational deficits visited upon the black citizens of
Mississippi, will further limit equal educational opportunity for black
citizens. That would be a perverse remedy for the victims of
Mississippi's discrimination.
3 T3
Although it is not clear why LDF so dramatically changed its position,
several factors could be at work. First, as demonstrated above, there was a high
amount of opposition to desegregation in the black community-LDF's
constituency. Second, the Adams court did say that any desegregation remedy
must be sensitive to the plight of the HBUs thereby implicitly rejecting LDF's
abolitionist approach. Finally, taking its hint from the D.C. Circuit in Adams,
OCR, in formulating desegregation criteria, made it clear that just simply
abolishing the HBUs was not an appropriate way for a state to dismantle its
dual system of higher education.314
The LDF shift in its position on desegregation of systems of higher education
exemplifies the ambivalence towards this issue in the black community. Black
responses to LDF litigation in this area have ranged from complete separation
to complete integration with most responses falling somewhere in the middle
of these two extremes. Yet, are these positions any more considered than those
advocated by commentators in the white community?
Until recently, LDF advocated abolition of the HBUs. It sought the "just
schools" rhetoric espoused by Professor Davis, Bunch and Mindle. However,
as explicated above, this is a myopic position because it ignores the impact this
approach will have on black students, faculty and staff. LDF, at one point,
assumed that black students, faculty and staff would simply be absorbed by
3121d. at 63.
313 Id. at 63-64.
314 See Revised Criteria Specifying the Ingredients of Acceptable Plans to Desegregate
State Systems of Higher Education, 43 Fed. Reg. 6658-64 (1978). The criteria
distinguished between desegregation inhigher education and in elementary/secondary
education. Differences in institutional roles, organization and governance required
different remedies. The criteria also reaffirmed the important continuing function of
black public colleges and required commitments to upgrade them, but did not exempt
them from the obligations of Title VI. Finally, the criteria included both measures to
increase the access of black students to traditionally white colleges and to enhance the
educational opportunities available at traditionally black colleges.
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the white institutions. 315 This assumption is unrealistic because the current
numbers in Mississippi demonstrate that desegregation is not that easy.
316
There are several problems including the lack of secondary schooling
preventing most black students from qualifying for admission to the HWUS,
317
lack of black faculty holding the Ph.D. degree,318 and racism.319 For his part,
at least Professor Robert Davis is honest and admits that in integrating the
HWUs there will be casualties and since the HBUs' students, faculty and
facilities are inferior to those of the HWUs', the casualties will all be suffered
in the black community.320
To prevent these casualties in the black community, other commentators
urge that the HBUs be protected from elimination and enhanced.
321 This
position does not radically differ from the position expressed by Connell. She
advocates maintenance of the status quo, a do nothing approach, while these
black commentators urge maintenance of the status quo, but more funding.
322
They claim this approach is appropriate because enhancement, among other
things, will attract white students and thereby encourage integration.
323
However, there are at least two problems with this approach. First, the Supreme
Court made it clear in Fordice that enhancement of the HBUs so that they can
become separate, but more equal enclaves for black students, faculty and staff
is illegal.324
Second, even if this were a legally permissible action, it does not really solve
the problem for the following reason: Currently, there are two universities
proximately situated to one another. One, the HBU, is clearly inferior to the
other, the HWU. Enhancing the HBU to be the clear equal of the HWU does
315 See Petitioners Brief, Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), reprinted
in HAYNES, supra note 221.
316 During the 1991-92 school year the HWUs received approximately $132 million
from the State while the HBUs received approximately $30 million. In fact, the total
received by the HBUs was $5 to $10 million less than the appropriation for University
of Mississippi ($35 million), Mississippi State University ($43 million) and University
of Southern Mississippi ($38 million). SeeAndyKanengiser, Funding Answer to Problems,
Say Black Colleges, THE CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), June 27,1992, at 10A Col. 1.
3 17Less than 30% of the black students scored 15 (the score needed to gain admission
to the HWUs) or better on the ACT. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2739.
3 181d. at 2742.
319 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 178, at 72; Motion of Former University of Mississippi
Black Students, supra note 196, at 8-12.
320Davis, supra note 11, at 489.
321 See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief, supra note 172; NAFEO's Brief, supra note 221; LDF Brief,
supra note 191; Bell, Waiting on the Promise of Brown, supra note 16.
3221d.
323 /d.
324 Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2743.
[Vol. 42.377
50https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/8
DESEGREGATION AS A TWO-WAY STREET
not change the choices students have to make. The only change is that now
white students will attend a quality HWU and black students will attend a
quality HBU. In fact, those black students thinking about attending the HWU
because of its superior quality, may now actually attend the equally quality
HBU! This situation is hardly what the Supreme Court had in mind in Fordice.
To confirm that this situation would be the result of an enhancement strategy,
one need look no further than Mississippi's neighbor, Louisiana. After the
Adams litigation, Louisiana entered into a consent decree with OCR which
provided that Louisiana would take steps to enhance the HBUs to make them
attractive enough to whites that whites would start desegregating the HBUs. 325
Between 1981 and 1987, Louisiana spent $200 million on enhancing the HBUs
and still, the white people did not come.326 The district court judge found that
"the consent decree as implemented has proved no viable solution. If anything,
the consent decree has exacerbated the segregation; many of the schools are
more racially polarized now than they were just before the consent decree was
implemented in 1981.11327
As the situation in Louisiana poignantly demonstrates, mere enhancement
of the HBUs is not enough to dismantle a dual system of segregation or even
to encourage desegregation. More is required and should be undertaken to
fulfill the state's obligation as articulated by the Court in Fordice. Since I find
that the responses in both the black and white communities fall short, in the
final part of this paper, I propose my own remedy.
V. PART IV: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
I would address the continuing vestiges of separate and unequal public
higher education in Mississippi and states like it by adopting policies and
practices that encourage integration while increasing the educational
opportunities for black students. To this end, I make three recommendations.
First Recommendation: Mississippi should adopt a two-tier classification
system: comprehensive and regional. It should then close or merge some of
the HWUs. Finally, it should designate one HBU and two HWUs as
comprehensive and then designate the other two HBU's and one other HWU
as regional.
Second Recommendation: Program offerings and admissions would be tied
to the two classifications. The comprehensive schools, which will offer a wide
variety of undergraduate and graduate courses and degrees, will be the most
competitive in admissions. While the regional schools, which will offer less of
a variety of both and will offer remedial courses, will be less competitive in
admissions. Also, each regional school will have a speciality in a particular area.
Third Recommendation: All schools in the system should develop an
affirmative action policy for faculty, staff, administration and students.
325United States v. Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. 509, 514 (E.D. La. 1981).
326United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642,644 (E.D. La. 1988).
3271d.
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Furthermore, each school should have scholarships available for minority
students (i.e., scholarships for blacks at HWUs and for whites at HBUs).
My proposal presents several benefits in that it addresses the concerns of the
Supreme Court and it is educationally justifiable. First, it is legally valid
because maintenance of the HBUs is a sound educational policy. In his
concurrence in Fordice, Justice Thomas found that 1) HBUs have expanded as
opportunities to go to white schools have expanded; 2) HBUs are still regarded
as a source of pride, leadership and upward mobility especially in the South;
3) states can operate a diverse assortment of institutions including HBUs, open
to all on a race-neutral basis, but with established traditions and programs that
might disproportionately attract one race or another; and 4) existence of the
HBUs does not constitute the kind of program duplication the majority wanted
eliminated. 328 Justice Thomas, therefore, concluded that, "Although I agree that
a State is not constitutionally required to maintain its [HBUs] as such,... I do
not understand our opinion to hold that a State is forbidden from doing so."329
Second, this plan addresses the Court's concern with maintenance of all eight
public universities. The Court found that the maintenance of all eight schools
was a remnant of dual segregation.330 The District Court found that this policy
was wasteful and irrational. 331 Under my proposal two schools are closed.
Since the HBUs serve a sound educational policy, there is no legal nor
educational impediment to closing only the HWUs.332
Third, my proposal addresses the Court's trouble with the admissions
requirements and program duplication. With respect to admissions, the Court
found that the ACT cut-off score of 15 was initiated and maintained to
perpetuate segregation.333 Also, the Court found no educational justification
for schools with the same mission designation having different admissions
requirements. 334 My proposal meets the Court's test in two ways. First, the
admissions requirements are tied to the mission designations, so that the three
comprehensive schools have the same admissions requirements and the three
regional schools have the same admissions requirements. Second, the mission
statements have not been assigned in a way that is tied to the past de jure system,
328Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727,2746 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
3291d. (emphasis in original).
330 d. at 2742.
33 1id.
332 1n footnote 11, the Court points to a letter sent to Mississippi officials by the
Department of Education saying that the "overall objective" is to have students chose
schools on "'other than racial criteria."' Id. at 2743 n.11. The letter went on to say however,
that the closing of a HBU "would create a presumption that a greater burden is being
placed upon the black students and faculty in Mississippi." Id.
333112 S. Ct. at 2738. At the time the cut-off score was adopted whites were averaging
18 on the test while blacks were averaging 7.
334 d. at 2739.
[Vol. 42:377
52https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/8
DESEGREGATION AS A TWO-WAY STREET
and since the admissions requirements are tied to the mission assignments, the
admission requirements are no longer tied to the past system.
Fourth, my proposal speaks to the Court's problem with the mission
statements. The Court found that during de jure segregation, the state funding
and curriculum decisions were based on the purposes for which the institutions
were established.335 The subsequent mission statements adopted in 1981 were
based on the past policies and practices and therefore designed to perpetuate
segregation.3 36 Yet, the Court said that "We do not suggest that absent
discriminatory purpose the assignment of different missions to various
institutions in a State's higher education system would raise an equal
protection issue where one or more of the institutions become or remained
predominantly black or white."33 7 My plan meets this standard because the
mission statements are not assigned on the basis of any past de jure system. In
fact, it creates a comprehensive university out of one of the HBUs where
currently none of the HBUs are designated as comprehensive. Moreover, if,
despite these new assignments, the schools stay predominantly white or black
because there is no discriminatory purpose, the schools would not violate the
equal protection clause.
My proposal also addresses program duplication. The Court defined
program duplication as "those instances where two or more institutions offer
the same nonessential or noncore program."338 The Court found that this kind
of program duplication was necessary to maintain a segregated system. 339
Under my proposal, the comprehensive and regional schools will offer
different nonessential and noncore programs. Furthermore, my proposal
requires that each regional school specialize in a particular area, similar to
magnet schools on the secondary school level, which will eradicate much of
the program duplication found today. Finally, since the mission statements,
which define what courses are offered at a particular institution, are no longer
traceable to a system of de jure segregation, the program duplication concern
has largely been eliminated.
Finally, my program encourages integration of students and staff through
affirmative action. In University of California Regents v. Bakke340 and again in City
335Id. at 2741.
336Id. at 2742.
337Id.
338112 S. Ct. at 2742.
3391d. at 2741.
340438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, the Supreme Court struck down an affirmative action
plan at the University of California at Davis medical school whereby the medical school
reserved 16 places in a 100 person class for minorities. Bakke, a white student, sued
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, claiming that he was discriminated against becausehe waswhite. No more
than a plurality emerged for each opinion. Four justices felt that race could never be
used in the admissions process. Four other justices felt that the quota did not violate the
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of Richmond v. 1. A. Croson,3 41 the Supreme Court held that quotas in admissions
violate the equal protection clause. Nonetheless, Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke makes it clear that using race as one factor in the admissions process is
valid.3 4 2 An argument can be made that under Croson, such an affirmative
action policy that includes race as a factor is still subject to strict scrutiny.
However, in Croson, Justice O'Connor held that race conscious remedies will
survive strict scrutiny where there is specific evidence that the university has
discriminated on the basis of race.343 The Supreme Court found that the
admissions policies in Mississippi discriminated on the basis of race. So, an
affirmative action plan in admissions in Mississippi would probably survive a
Croson challenge.
With respect to staff, the Supreme Court agreed in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education3 44 that public employers may sometimes voluntarily embark upon
a race-conscious scheme for remedying past employment discrimination. 34 5
Similar to the reasoning in Croson, the Court reasoned here that a state could
adopt an affirmative action program where there was at least a "strong basis in
evidence" that remedial action was necessary.346 My proposal meets this legal
standard because one, it advocates the adoption of a voluntary affirmative
action program and two, the Supreme Court itself found a "strong basis in the
Constitution. Justice Powell provided the fifth vote striking down the quotas, but
upholding the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process.
341488U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, the Supreme Court struck down an affirmative action
plan in the City of Richmond, Virginia, which set-aside 30% of the total dollar amount
of city contracts for minority business enterprises. The plaintiff in Croson was a
white-owned prime contractor seeking a city contract who claimed that he could not
find a minority owned business who could supply 30% of the work at a reasonable cost.
He sued the city claiming that the set-aside violated his right to equal protection of the
law. Justice 0 'Connor wrote for the Court holding that government imposed racial
classifications were subject to strict scrutiny whether they were designed to benefit
minorities or designed to discriminate against minorities.
342Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12 (Powell, J.). Powell says, "[Tihe attainment of a diverse
student body.., clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education." Id.
343488 U.S. at 486.
344476 U.S. 267 (1986).
34 5Wygant concerned lay-offs in a public school district. The school district had
recently hired several black teachers to remedy its racial imbalance in teachers.
However, once the lay-offs started, seniority dictated that the first hired should be the
first fired. Knowing that this procedure would wipe out the gains the district had made
in hiring black teachers, it implemented a modified lay-off procedure which required
laying off the same percentage of black and white teachers. The Court found that this
procedure violated the equal protection rights of the white teachers with seniority. The
Court applied strict scrutiny to the lay-off procedure. They also found that the role
model theory was not a compelling state interestnor was remedying past discrimination
in general.
346 1d. at 277.
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evidence" that Mississippi discriminated on the basis of race in the hiring of
faculty and administration at the HWUs and the HBUs.
Educationally, my proposal presents several benefits. First, by bringing
HBUs into a unified system as either comprehensive or regional ensures that
they will receive the funding necessary to fulfill their missions. The receipt of
appropriate funding will allow them to better serve their historical
constituency as well as a new constituency of white students who will be
attracted by the improved facilities and course offerings. 3
47
Unlike the status quo approach of Connell or the enhancement approach of
petitioners in Fordice or the amicus briefs of LDF and NAFEO in Fordice, this
proposal will create integration because it couples enhancement with the
closing of a proximate university. Compare what happened in Louisiana where
HBUs were enhanced with no concomitant closure of proximate schools with
what happened in Tennessee. In that state, Tennessee State University
[hereinafter TSU] was located in Nashville as was an extension branch of the
University of Tennessee [hereinafter UT]. In Geier v. University of Tennessee,348
the Sixth Circuit required the closing of UT coupled with the enhancement of
TSU. At the time of the order, in 1979, TSU was over 90% black and UT was
over 90% white.349 Today, after spending $112 million on upgrading TSU's
facilities, the school is 30% white and has a faculty that is 50% white.35
0
While some at TSU are unhappy with such successful desegregation,351 I
assert that TSU should serve as a model for desegregation of a state's system
of higher education. TSU received the funds it needed to provide a quality
education to all, the school has attracted white students and it has managed to
desegregate in a way that maintains many of the benefits that HBUs provide
such as a comfortable atmosphere, role models, affordability, and admission
standards that reflect the kind of secondary education its historical
constituency has received.
A second educational benefit of my proposal is that by increasing the
admissions standards and the program offerings at the HBUs, they will attract
the brightest of both races. Professor Davis claimed that he wanted to
implement "flexible" admission criteria.352 These admission criteria would
include GPA, test scores and life experience. These are good admissions
standards for the comprehensive schools. Under my proposal, one HBU would
347The Mississippi State Legislature has proposed upgrading Jackson State into a
comprehensive university. Black Universities; Delta Blues, supra note 192, at 30.
348597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886 (1979).
349Id.
350 The Ambiguous Success of Desegregation at Tennessee State University, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., May 5, 1993, at 10.
35 11d. Many black students are concerned that the school may be losing its cultural
heritage and want the school to resist any more desegregation.
352Davis, supra note 11, at 491.
1993-94]
55Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
become a comprehensive school with no nearby HWU. Thus, if what happened
at TSU happens in Mississippi, the comprehensive HBU will attract the
brightest of both races.
A third educational benefit of my proposal is that by designating some
HWUs as regional, requiring them to offer remedial programs, and
implementing a less stringent admissions policy, they will attract black
students. Professor Davis proposed that students not qualified for the
comprehensive schools go to junior colleges with a possibility of transfer.
Under my proposal, however, those students academically unprepared for the
comprehensive schools will be admitted to the regional schools which will have
remedial courses and other programs designed to ensure that they too receive
a quality education. Since, there will only be one regional school in each region,
these schools should attract students of both races who need these special
programs.
Finally, by developing a speciality at each regional school, students of both
races interested in that speciality will attend that school. In discussing the
placement of new programs on campuses in Southern states, the Southern
Regional Education Board advocates that the program should have the
following characteristics: "A likelihood of student demand, a likelihood of
societal need to absorb graduates, the ability to build upon the strength already
existing within the institution, and the opportunity to draw upon local or
regional resources to supplement the growth of the program."353
Developing a speciality at each school would have saved Louisiana a lot of
time had they adopted such a strategy early on in the desegregation movement.
But they chose not to354 and now face another round in the federal district court
as the Department of Justice continues to press Louisiana to meet the Fordice
standard.355
This is an "ought to" proposal because I am not an educator nor am I a
Mississippi resident and facing the political and economic choices people in
that state will have to make. 356 As a result, I recognize the limitations of my
proposal. For instance, how to decide which HBU to upgrade to
comprehensive, which two HWUs to downgrade to regional and which two
HWUs to close? As another example, how much money can the State afford to
spend on upgrading the HBUs? Another question is how to upgrade the black
3 5 3 SOUTHERN REGIONAL EDUCATION BOARD, EDUCATIONAL FACTORS RELATED TO
FEDERAL CRITERIAFORTHE DESEGREGATIONOF PUBLIC POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION (1981).
3 54When he first became governor in 1972, Edwards told LSU faculty that he was
offered an opportunity to settle the brewing dispute by shifting all engineering
programs to Southern and all history programs, for example, to LSU. I said no because
I refused to preside over the dismantling of two great institutions," he said. Jack
Wardlaw, Desegregation Dispute Likely Headed for Trial, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 8,1994., at
1.
3 551d.
3 56See, e.g., Ronald Smothers, Blacks and Whites Condemn Plan To Integrate Mississippi's
Campuses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1992, at 1.
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faculty since most do not have Ph.D's, and those that do have them in
education? These are a few of the limitations of my proposal. Yet Tennessee
faced some, if not all of these questions, and the State was able to answer them
sufficiently to make TSU a desegregation success.
Ultimately, my proposal is one for desegregation/integration. I think
integration is a positive goal. My primary concern in this paper has been to
demonstrate that there is no necessary correlation between integration and
increased educational opportunities. In other words, any plan for
desegregating higher education should not decrease the net educational
opportunities for black students. My plan encourages integration and provides
for increased educational opportunity for black students. The most important
way it achieves this balance is by ensuring that integration does not flow all
one way: shutting down the HBUs and requiring the black students to go to
the HWUs.357 By ensuring that integration is a two way street, it spreads the
benefits and burdens equally between both races and institutions.358 This
benefit and burden sharing is important educationally and psychologically.
For, to place the burden of integration solely on black students and black
institutions would be extremely unfair. As Justice Thomas said in his
concurrence in Fordice "it would be ironic, to say the least, if the institutions that
sustained blacks during segregation were themselves destroyed in an effort to
combat its vestiges."35 9
357 Currently in Mississippi, the state legislature is considering a proposal that closes
MVSU, merges Alcom State with MSU and only retains Jackson State. So, in effect, the
legislature is considering a form of Davis' proposal whereby the HBUs are eliminated
and the HWUs maintained. "This is genocide," said Alvin Chambliss, a lawyer fighting
the state of Mississippi in its effort to close the Mississippi Valley State University
campus and merge another traditionally black university. Ernie Freda, Traditionally
Black Schools Call Court Ruling 'Genocide,' ATLANTA J. & CoNST., Apr. 8, 1993, at 4. "It's a
political war that if we lose, black folks in America will go back to the cotton patch." Id.
While Chambliss' comments overstate the situation, the bottom-line is that this kind of
one way integration is ineffective and unfair because not only does it fail to increase
educational opportunities for blacks, but actually decreases educational opportunity.
35 8 Mississippi Congressman Mike Espy, in responding to calls for blacks and whites
to fight each other over desegregation in his home state, dispatched the following letter
which said in part: "In my opinion, education must not be a 'zero-sum game,' in which
Blacks and Whites are pitted against one another. If that is the case then we all will lose."
Quoted in Does Decision To Close Black University in Miss. Doom State-Supported Black
Colleges And Universities?, JET, Nov. 30, 1992, at 4.
35 9Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2746 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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